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Introduction

The North American Black Duck
(Anas rubripes): A Case Study of 28
Years of Failure in American
Wildlife Management
John W. Grandy

The black duck (Anas rubripes)
population has been declining for many
years, since at least 1955 (Fig. 1 ). This
change has been chronicled by, most
particularly, the winter inventory (depicted in Fig. 1), but also by the observations of hunters, bird watchers, U.S. and
Canadian biologists, officials from private conservation organizations, and
others. Verification of the decline has
taken a variety of forms: deductive reasoning based on underutilized breeding
and wintering habitats, marked declines
in hunter success based on kill per thousand hunter days and kill per successful
hunter, measured declines in breeding

Monograph

populations, high reproductive rates
(characteristic of a population at a level
substantially below carrying capacity),
and declines in indirect population estimates based on analyses of banding
data (see: Barske, 1968; Munro, 1968;
Benson, 1968; Reed, 1968; Addy, 1968;
Ceis et a/., 1971; Blandin, 1975, 1982;
Anon., 1976, 1980, 1983; Crissey, 1976;
Williams, 1976; Hunt, 1978; Newell and
Boyd, 1978; Spencer, 1979, 1982, 1982a;
Longcore, 1981; Maine, 1982; Hagar,
1982; Heusmann, 1982; Smith, 1983;
Connor, 1983). Using the winter inventory as a measure, the average rate of
dec! ine has been about 2% per year
(since 1955) and the population has declined about 60%. The decline has been

FIGURE 1 Black duck Winter Inventory, 1955-1983 1 (Courtesy U.S. FWS (Anon., 1983)).
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(f)

::.::

A scientific and technical analysis is presented of the factors which may have
been primarily responsible for an estimated 60% decline in the black duck (Anas
rubripes) population since 1955. The analyses presented show that the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS], the management agency responsible for waterfowl management in the United States, has recognized the population decline, that the FWS's own
experts have consistently recognized that hunting is the most likely cause of the
population decline, and that hunting is the only mortality factor which wildlife
managers can control in the practical sense. Using FWS information, the author
shows, however, that from 1967 to 1982, regulations permitting killing of black ducks
have in net effect only been made more permissive, while, since the early 1970's, the
numbers of hunters and hunter days (hunter effort] have remained relatively high and
hunting has accounted for 50% to 60% of total mortality. The author terms the consistent failure of the FWS to take effective regulatory action to stop the decline and
to attempt to restore the black duck population a failure of modern-day wildlife
management. Using a series of quotations from knowledgeable individuals, the
author presents an analysis of why this failure has occurred.
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'Estimates are that the Winter Survey (Winter Inventory) records 1/3 to 1/5 of all black ducks (Martinson et

a/., 1968:48; Martinet a/., 1967; Anon. 1976:8). The validity of using the winter inventory as an indicator of
population trend is discussed by Smith (1983:3), Crissey (1976:2), and Heusmann (1980).
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FIGURE 2 Range of the Black Duck (Courtesy U.S. FWS (Anon., 1983)).
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tion was at its lowest point in about 20
years and that major restrictions on
black duck kill were necessary to allow
the population to rebuild.
In 1982, continued failure of the
FWS to take action (Table 1) to protect
the black duck and the continuing deterioration of the black duck's status
(Maine, 1982; Blandin, 1982; Spencer,
i 982; Heusmann, 1982; Fig. 1) caused
The Humane Society of the United
States (HSUS), the Maine Audubon Society, and one HSUS member from Maine
to sue the FWS for a closed season. The
suit was unsuccessfu I (Green, 1982).
However, all agree that the decline of
the black duck is real. Indeed, the Judge
began the legal decision by noting that
there had been a sharp decline in the
black duck population (Green, 1982:3).
The question remains for wildlife
biologists, wildlife administrators, and

the interested lay public: what happened
to the system of wildlife management in
the United States (and to some extent,
Canada) that caused it to so consistently
fai I to take necessary protective action
on behalf of the black duck?
To that end, this paper examines, in
some detail, the potential reasons for
the black duck population decline, the
failure of the FWS and the States to take
necessary corrective action, and the reasons for that failure, in the hope that
recognition of the factors involved will
help prevent future failures and simultaneously help insure the welfare of wildlife.

Materials and Methods
Literature on black ducks has been
systematically reviewed. Primary sources
of this literature were the files of the

Breeding
Breeding and wintering

TABLE 1 Atlantic Flyway Hunting Regulations-1953-1982*
§wintering

Year

essentially rangewide 1 (Fig. 2), being
most pronounced in the U.S. and western
portions of the Canadian breeding range
(see, for example, Stotts and Davis'
(1960) study of what was then a major
breeding population in the Chesapeake
Bay area).
However, despite the decline,
acknowledged repeatedly by the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), the
Canadian Wildlife Service (CWS), and by
the relevant State conservation (or fish
'The one possible exception to the rangewide decline is the Canadian Maritime Provinces. Newell
and Boyd (1978) presented data suggesting that the
population had not declined there. However, the
Newell and Boyd analysis only covered data through
1976. Recent data (Spencer, 1982) showing a 76%
decrease in Maine's black duck breeding populations strongly suggest that breeding populations
may now be declining in the adjacent Canadian Maritime Provinces.
4

and wildlife) agencies, regulations governing black duck hunting have, in sum,
only been liberalized since 1968 (Table
1 ). Indeed, since 1970, hunting seasons
have, each year, been more permissive
than in 1968, and the status of the black
duck population has continued to deteriorate (Fig. 1 ). Furthermore, the negative
effect of liberalized seasons has been
compounded because the numbers of
hunters and hunter days increased sharply
between 1968 and the early 1970's, and
have remained relatively high since then
(Administrative Reports, files, Office of
Migratory Bird Management, Patuxent
Wildlife Research Center; Martin and
Carney, 1977). And, 1968 was, significantly, the year that Black Duck Symposium participants (Barske, 1968; Addy
and Martinson, 1968:183-188; Addy, 1968a)
concluded that the black duck populaSUPPLEMENT TO /NT 1STUD ANIM PROB 4(4) 1983

1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982

Bag
Season
Black
Length Total Duck

60
60
70
70
70
60
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
45
40
40
40
40
40
50
45
45··
45··
45··
45··
50
50
50
50
50

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
2
2
2
4
4
4
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Bag
or Season
Black or
Length Total Duck

50
50
50
50
50
50
50
55
50
50
50
50
50
50
45
45••
45··
45··
45··
50
50
50
50
50

3
3

3
3

2
2

2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

Bag
Season
Black or
Length Total Duck

Bag
Season
Black
Length Total Duck

3
3
3

2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

47
60
60
60
50
50t
45••
45•·
45•·
50
50
50
50
50

4
3
3
3
pts.
pts.
pts.
pts.
pts.
pts.
pts.
pts.
pts.
pts.

1
1
1
1
"70"
"70"
"70"
"70"
"70"
"70"
"70"
"70"
"70"
"70"

57

3

*Possession limit is double the daily bag in all instances. Split season allowed with 10% penalty through
1969 and no penalty thereafter. Table 1 was provided by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 1982.
**50 Days, with Wednesday noon opening.
tSS Days, with Wednesday noon opening.
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FIGURE 2 Range of the Black Duck (Courtesy U.S. FWS (Anon., 1983)).
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i 982; Heusmann, 1982; Fig. 1) caused
The Humane Society of the United
States (HSUS), the Maine Audubon Society, and one HSUS member from Maine
to sue the FWS for a closed season. The
suit was unsuccessfu I (Green, 1982).
However, all agree that the decline of
the black duck is real. Indeed, the Judge
began the legal decision by noting that
there had been a sharp decline in the
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population had not declined there. However, the
Newell and Boyd analysis only covered data through
1976. Recent data (Spencer, 1982) showing a 76%
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may now be declining in the adjacent Canadian Maritime Provinces.
4

and wildlife) agencies, regulations governing black duck hunting have, in sum,
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U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's Office of
Migratory Bird Management in Washington, D.C., 20240, and related files at the
FWS's Patuxent Wildlife Research Center
in Laurel, Maryland 20708.

sponsible for the content and conclusions of this paper.

I should note here that this paper is
a scientific and technical analysis of a
situation which contains elements of
science, politics, and other factors. For
that reason, the literature cited is not
always scientific literature; rather it is
sometimes scientific, and sometimes consists of memos, letters, and unpublished
reports (authored by acknowledged experts
or officials in positions of responsibility)
which often represented the best and only information on which to base black
duck management decisions. In presenting the "Literature Cited" section, I have
attempted to present enough information
to allow the interested reader to locate, obtain, and evaluate the information which
I have analyzed and which leads me to
the conclusions I have reached.

Cause of Population Decline

Acknowledgments
I acknowledge and appreciate the
help of the late Dr. Warren W. Blandin,
former Atlantic Flyway Representative
(biologist), Patuxent Wildlife Research
Center, in assembling most of the information discussed herein. Henry M. Reeves,
formerly of the Office of Migratory Bird
Management, FWS, provided legally permitted access to the files in Washington,
D.C, and critically commented on the
manuscript. Dr. Stephen Kellert, Yale
University; Dr. Warren B. King, Chairman, U.S. Section of the International
Council for Bird Preservation; and Howard Spencer, Wildlife Research Supervisor, Maine Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife provided helpful comments, as did Joseph A. Hagar, former
Massachusetts State Ornithologist, and
John W. Lanier, Chief Biologist, White
Mountain National Forest in New Hampshire. Despite this help, I alone am re6

Results and Discussion
The cause of the population decline must be, and must have been, total
annual mortality that exceeds total annual production (Anon., 1980:16) or the
ability of the population to replenish
itself. For the purposes of this discussion, however, causes of the decline are
divided into hunting mortality and other
potential causes of the population decline. Additional discussion is provided
of the role of competition and/or hybridization with the mallard (Anas platyrhynchos), because this has been mentioned
often by the FWS as a cause of the black
duck population decline.

Hunting
Results of major investigations into
the cause or causes of the black duck
population decline were not widely published during the late 1950's and early
1960's. Rather, it appears that much research was underway during this period
but was not reported until the Black
Duck Symposium in 1968 (Barske, 1968)2 .
Indeed, the Black Duck Symposium
convened most of those then interested
in or acknowledged as experts on black
ducks. Sixty-nine participants registered:
20 from the U.S. Bureau of Sport
Fisheries and Wildlife (hereinafter referred to as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), the Federal agency responsible for migratory bird conservation and
management in the U.S.); 27 from State
conservation (or fish and wildlife) agen'The Black Duck Symposium, containing 16 papers
and a record of discussions, was published in 1968
by the Atlantic Waterfowl Council and Wildlife
Management Institute (WMI), and was edited by WMI
employee Philip Barske. Throughout this paper, the
Symposium as a whole is cited as Barske (1968); individual papers and/or discussions are cited as
"Author" (1968).
SUPPLEMENT TO /NT I STUD ANIM PROB 4[4) 1983
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cies in the United States; 6 from the
Canadian Wildlife Service ((CWS), Canadian equivalent of the FWS); 5 from Provincial conservation agencies in Canada;
6 from Canadian or U.S. universities; and
5 from private organizations. The purpose of the Symposium, in recognition
of the declining status of the black duck,
was to bring "together most of the known
information on this species and to focus
attention on its future needs." (Anon.,
1968:1).
The 1968 Symposium on black ducks
provided substantial evidence of a causal link between hunting and the population decline, as the following excerpts
show.
C. E. Addy, then Atlantic Flyway
Representative (biologist) for the FWS,
stated:

"[T]he evidence indicates that
harvest has been excessive in relation to production. Kill has been
the primary factor responsible for
holding the population down to the
level that it is." (Addy, 1968:4).
William T. Munro, Wildlife Biologist, Eastern Region, Canadian Wildlife Service stated:

"Most field workers in Canada believe that the major cause of this
[black duck] decline is over-harvest."
(Munro, 1968:7).
Austin Reed, biologist with
Quebec Wildlife Service, stated:

the

"The consensus of opinion [among
Canadian biologists] is that the size
of the hunting kill is the most likely
explanation [for the population dec/ in e). ... A close correlation has
been observed between Mid-Winter
Survey counts of black ducks in the
Atlantic Flyway and the breeding
population on lie aux Pommes the
following spring [Figure V). This
suggests the like/ ihood that popu lation level is being regulated beSUPPLEMENT TO /NT I STUD ANIM PROB 4[4) 1983
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tween late summer and mid-January
[a period which corresponds closely with the hunting season)." (Reed,
1968:82).
R. K. Martinson, A. D. Geis, and R. I.
Smith, all FWS employees responsible
for waterfowl investigations at Patuxent
Wildlife Research Center, reported that
hunting caused 50% to 60% of total
mortality and concluded:

"At that time [mid 1950's], hunting
regulations were then relaxed and
large kills were made. Despite a
high population, the rate of kill was
sufficient to boost total mortality
higher than productivity, and the
black duck population began to decline. By 1959, the black duck population was obviously at a low level
and hunting regulations were made
very restrictive. The resu /ting annual kills were small compared to
earlier years but still large enough,
with the much reduced size of the
black duck population, to result in
a kill rate of a magnitude that appears to have prevented an increase
in the population." (Martinson et
a/., 1968:43,50).
C. E. Addy and R. K. Martinson in
presenting the final paper at the Symposium stated:

"Speakers at this symposium
generally share the opinion that the
black duck population is low and
that wise management dictates that
we do something to increase the
size of the population. Most speakers
also felt that hunting regulations effect the size and rate of kill and,
thus, the survival of black ducks."
(Addy and Martinson, 1968:183).
After the Symposium, Addy summarized the proceedings for his superiors at FWS, stating:

"It was the consensus of the group
that while surveys were unreliable
7
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tween late summer and mid-January
[a period which corresponds closely with the hunting season)." (Reed,
1968:82).
R. K. Martinson, A. D. Geis, and R. I.
Smith, all FWS employees responsible
for waterfowl investigations at Patuxent
Wildlife Research Center, reported that
hunting caused 50% to 60% of total
mortality and concluded:

"At that time [mid 1950's], hunting
regulations were then relaxed and
large kills were made. Despite a
high population, the rate of kill was
sufficient to boost total mortality
higher than productivity, and the
black duck population began to decline. By 1959, the black duck population was obviously at a low level
and hunting regulations were made
very restrictive. The resu /ting annual kills were small compared to
earlier years but still large enough,
with the much reduced size of the
black duck population, to result in
a kill rate of a magnitude that appears to have prevented an increase
in the population." (Martinson et
a/., 1968:43,50).
C. E. Addy and R. K. Martinson in
presenting the final paper at the Symposium stated:

"Speakers at this symposium
generally share the opinion that the
black duck population is low and
that wise management dictates that
we do something to increase the
size of the population. Most speakers
also felt that hunting regulations effect the size and rate of kill and,
thus, the survival of black ducks."
(Addy and Martinson, 1968:183).
After the Symposium, Addy summarized the proceedings for his superiors at FWS, stating:

"It was the consensus of the group
that while surveys were unreliable
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indicators of population status and
that no surveys gave an accurate
current population figure, the overall
Flyway population had been declining and was probably at its lowest level of the past 20 years. Papers
were presented on the various factors which tend to reduce- the population or lower its productivity such
as predation, loss of habitat, pollution, pesticides and others. However, with these factors in operation
it was generally agreed that hunting
kill was too great for the population
to maintain itself at a high level. In
fact, it was generally acknowledged
that hunting kill is the only major
mortality factor we can do anything
about at the present time." (Addy,
1968a).
In 1971, a Special Scientific Report
by three FWS biologists (Aelred D. Geis,
Robert I. Smith (now in charge of black
duck management, FWS) and John P. Rogers, (now and since 1972 the Chief of the
FWS Migratory Bird Management program)
analyzed all banding data from 1922 to
1960. The report noted that about 50%
of total mortality was caused by hunting
and concluded, in part:

"According to the winter survey,
the continental black duck population declined greatly between 1952
and 1962. It is believed that the
survey data correctly reflect the
population trend during these years.
Although the population was at a
lower level, and the kill much
smaller in 1959-1962 than in 19521954, band recovery data show that
kill rates were equally high in the
two periods. The population decline
was probably due to a high rate of
kill associated with 70-day seasons
and 4-bird bag limits during 19551958. Failure of the black duck
population to recover in recent
years despite a lower kill is appar8
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ently due to a continued high kill
rate." (Geis eta/., 1971:49, 63).
In 1974, Frank B. McGilvery, a FWS
waterfowl biologist then stationed at
Patuxent Wildlife Research Center, was
asked to evaluate the black duck winter
inventories over the preceding ten years.
He reported to his superiors:

"In reviewing the material compiled
herein and in re-reading the material
in the black duck symposium held
at Chestertown in 1968, I am struck
by what appears to be an inescapable fact- the major, amendable problem with the black duck is excessive
harvest." (Emphasis in original). (McGilvery, 1974:1).
In 1976, Walter F. Crissey, formerly
FWS Senior Scientist and for ten years
Director of the FWS's Migratory Bird
Population Station, wrote an authoritative report on black ducks in which he
concluded:

"[J]t seems to me that all of the
available information favors the hypothesis that over-harvest has been
the most likely cause of the decline." (Crissey 1976:6).
In 1976, Anderson and Burnham
(1976), both FWS biostatisticians at
Patuxent Wildlife Research Center, published part of a study on mallards in
which they concluded that past regression analyses which had been used in
Martinson et a/. (1968) and Geis et a/.
(1971) to "prove" an additive relationship between hunting mortality and total mortality in black ducks, were invalid. Anderson and Burnham did not
show that such a relationship does not
exist. They simply used mathematical
techniques to invalidate the regression
analysis which biologists had previously
used. Anderson and Burnham did not refute- or even discuss- all of the other
points made at the Black Duck Symposium
(Barske, 1968) and elsewhere (i.e., Geis et
SUPPLEMENT TO /NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 4(4) 1983
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a/., 1971) suggesting a definite causal
relationship between hunting mortality
and the black duck population decline.
Anderson and Burnham also did not
show or even suggest that the program
designed by Addy and Martinson (1968)
to restore the black duck population
would not have been successful.
I.R.P. is the abbreviation for an "Important Resource Problem." Identification of such a problem provides a mechanism within the FWS for devising a
strategy to combat the problem and for
procuring funds to solve the problem. In
1980, the Service prepared an I.R.P.
strategy paper to assess problems associated with declining populations of
black ducks and designated the continuing decline of the black duck population the twentieth most pressing resource problem in the United States
(Anon., 1980). As a result of the I.R.P. designation, in 1980 the FWS assembled a
group of 19 waterfowl, coastal, and estuarine experts to examine the problems
facing black ducks. These experts concluded:

"[T]he declining numbers of black
ducks are primarily the result of annual mortality that exceeds production. Most of that mortality is directly related to hunting." (Anon.,
1980:16).
In 1982, H.W. Heusmann, waterfowl biologist for Massachusetts stated
when discussing the decline of the con"
tinental black duck population:

fowl biologist, FWS, concluded that kill
of black ducks, particularly immatures,
had been excessive throughout the principal breeding range of the species. He
further concluded that such kill would
ensure a declining population (Blandin
1982:122). In reaching his conclusion,
Blandin (1982:89; 1982a:2) presented
data comparing hunting mortality for
the black duck and the mallard. (See below.)
These figures show that hunting is a
far more important mortality factor for
the black duck than for the mallard. Furthermore, the detrimental effect of hunting for black ducks is compounded by
the fact that total mortality for immature black ducks is 7% higher than
for immature mallards (Blandin, 1982a:2).
In 1982, Joseph A. Hagar, former
Massachusetts State Ornithologist and a
respected authority on black ducks, concluded on the basis of available data
and his knowledge, that hunting is a
significant contributing cause of the
black duck decline. Hagar also noted
"that black ducks are under heavy gunning pressure and that many hunters in
the northeast try to shoot black ducks
above all other species." (Hagar, 1982).
In 1982, the Black Duck Management Plan, developed by professional
waterfowl biologists working for U.S.
States and Canadian Provinces in the
Atlantic Flyway, together with CWS and
FWS officials, explicity acknowledged a
link between hunting and population decline and stated:

"[H]unting is responsible for further
reducing the [black duck] population." (Heusmann, 1982:17)
In 1982, Dr. Warren W. Blandin,
based on the extensive analyses in .his
dissertation and his many years of experience as the Atlantic Flyway water-
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"Present levels of sport hunting are
depressing black duck populations
by reducing the survival of immature birds." (Spencer, 1982a:15).
The FWS agreed with this assessment in a publication dated September
17,1982 (Potter, 1982:41253).

HUNTING MORTALITY AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL MORTALITY

Black Duck
Mallard
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significant contributing cause of the
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"that black ducks are under heavy gunning pressure and that many hunters in
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above all other species." (Hagar, 1982).
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waterfowl biologists working for U.S.
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The 1971 FWS Special Scientific Report concluded that "[T]here was no
evidence of unusual mortality of black
ducks during the late winter and early
spring.", and that "[l]t appears that after
the close of the hunting season black
ducks survived at a relatively high rate"
and that "[L]ate winter and early spring
non-hunting mortality is not serious
when viewed on a continent-wide scale."
(Geis eta/., 1971 :66).

quency (Grandy, 1972:25), as did Hagar's
(1948, 1950) experience. However, even
if severe winter mortality occurs somewhat
more frequently than once every ten
years, it is a natural mortality factor with
which black ducks have always contended
and to which they have presumably
adapted, and over which managers have
no practical control because of the u npredictable and localized nature of such
mortality.

Other Potential Causes
The FWS, officially, and others such
as New jersey officials have consistently
stated that "other" factors are "major"
causes of the population decline. Among
those consistently cited are deterioration or loss of habitat, and in the case of
New jersey, severe winter mortality.
While some losses certainly are attributable to these causes, the data suggest
that they are not in any sense "major",
when compared with hunting.
The quantity and quality of black
duck wintering habitat has no doubt decreased since 1955; however, the available evidence suggests that wintering
habitat and winter mortality are not
limiting factors for the black duck. Indeed, the FWS I.R.P. paper essentially
concluded (in 1980) that wintering habitat was sufficient for black duck populations (Anon., 1980:13).

My doctoral research (concluded in
1972) suggests that more than adequate
food exists for black ducks in major
wintering areas, except under extremely
severe winter conditions (Grandy, 1972:
25). Indeed, since far fewer black ducks
are using important coastal wintering
grounds, as compared with 10 to 15 years
ago, and their habitat has not been occupied by other species, it seems logical to
conclude that there must be adequate
winter food and habitat. For example, no
one has suggested that the 52% decline
(Avg. 1972-76 com pared with Avg. 19771981) in the wintering population in
Maine (Spencer, 1982: App. A) has been
associated with a comparable deterioration in quantity or quality of available
habitat. Indeed, the contrary is more
likely true of the entire Atlantic Flyway:
still-suitable areas of habitat are unused
or underutilized by black ducks in comparison to carrying capacity and to past
use levels.
Crissey (1976:6) concluded that "I
know of nothing that supports" the contention that deterioration of wintering
habitat is a possible cause of the black
duck decline.
Local winter mortality may sometimes be substantial during severe winters (Hagar, 1948, 1950; Grandy, 1972;
Ferrigno (New jersey Fish and Game),
1982, pers. comm.; Anon., 1980:13). The
I.R.P. analysis noted that severe winter
mortality may occur about one year in
ten (Anon., 1980:13). My analysis of
weather patterns in New England suggested a somewhat greater potential fre-

As an aside, however, even if severe
winter mortality occurs somewhat more
frequently than once every ten years,
such a situation provides no rationale or
justification for encouraging a high level
of black duck hunting kill (as New jersey
officials have suggested) on the expectation that severe winter weather may
sometimes follow. Indeed, wildlife managers typically have never managed on
the basis of the lowest possible carrying
capacity, as caused by unpredictable
and nearly random catastrophic events
such as severe winter weather. For example, neither deer (Odocoileus v1rg1nianus) nor waterfowl have ever been
managed to attain the lowest possible
pre-winter population based on an analysis of the lowest possible carrying capacity, as caused by occasional severe
winters. Rather, managers typically attempt to manage for a high over-winter
population, so as to maximize reproduction. To do otherwise would completely
remove the beneficial effects on wildlife.
populations of genetic selection caused
by events such as winter mortality induced by food shortage, would reduce
the "margin for error" in traditional
wildlife management, and would necessitate extremely low wildlife populations.
The situation with respect to the
quantity and quality of available breeding
habitat is quite similar to that for wintering habitat. The black duck breeding
range in eastern Canada is more than
1,000,000 square miles (Reed, 1978;
Spencer, 1979). It includes the eastern
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The implication, or easily drawn inference, that the population is declining
only because of the death of immature
black ducks seems questionable at best.
The assertion is apparently based on
Blandin's (1982a:2) comparative mortality figures which show substantially
higher juvenile mortality rates from hunting for black ducks than for juvenile
mallards. This fact is certainly cause for
concern; however, when a population
declines by about 60%, as the black
duck population has, "the loss of adults
from the breeding population due to
hunting must have a negative impact on
the population" (Hagar 1982). In addition, as wildlife managers have long
recognized, since adults are presumably
experienced breeders, they are probably
more successful in producing young than
are ducks breeding for the first time.
Therefore, the loss of adults to the population is probably more debilitating to
the population (per duck killed) than is
the loss of immatures, and any suggestion or hypothesis that the population is
declining only because of hunting mortality of immatures should be rejected.
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Canadian boreal forest, the Maritime
Provinces, Quebec, and much of Ontario. Substantial additional potential
breeding range is found in the Eastern
United States (Fig. 2).
Breeding populations have declined
substantially or disappeared in major
parts of the historic breeding range, including areas of the mid-Atlantic States,
New England, New York, Quebec, and
Ontario. These declines are not, except
in a few instances, demonstrably associated with habitat changes. For example,
Canadian officials have consistently
concluded, beginning at the 1968 Black
Duck Symposium, that breeding habitat
is not a limiting factor in Canada (Munro
1968:7; Reed 1968:82; Spencer, 1976).
New York State biologist Dirck Benson
reported a similar, and increasing, trend
of vacant breeding habitat in the United
States (Benson, 1968:14). Participants attending the two-day Black Duck Workshop
in Calais, Maine, in July 1976 (including
FWS, CWS, State and Provincial officials) concluded that the available information indicated that Canadian breeding habitat for the black duck is not a
limiting factor (Spencer, 1976:6, App.:10).
Crissey, in his 1976 black duck report, concluded:

"In this respect, lack of either quantity or quality of breeding habitat
does not appear to be a limiting factor at present population levels.
Rather, the high rate of reproduction associated with black ducks in
recent years is characteristic of a
population that is well below the
carrying capacity of its breeding
habitat." (Crissey, 1976:7).
Blandin, in his 1982 doctoral dissertation, reaffirmed this conclusion:

"The implication for black ducks is
that although annual production
may be high in response to a declining breeding population, the recruitment of young birds into the
11
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breeding population is insufficient
to attain the rate of growth inherent
in the population and attainable relative to the carrying capacity of its
habitat." (Blandin, 1982:119).
Thus, Blandin and Crissey independently concluded that breeding habitat
is not a limiting factor.
Additional support for the suggestion that breeding habitat is not limiting
is found in recent data from Maine and
Massachusetts. Surveys of the same
marsh areas in Maine "suggest a 76%
decline in production [of young black
ducks] from 1956-1981" (Spencer,
1982:App. B). Furthermore, "none of the
data revealed any changing trends in the
average brood size" (Spencer, 1982:App.
B). Maine biologists (Spencer, 1983, pers.
comm.) also report that there has not
been any major influx of mallards into
traditional black duck nesting areas and
that measured declines in breeding
black ducks have not been correlated
with a concomitant increase in mallards
or any other species. Thus, the drastic
decline in black duck production is
caused by a lack of breeders, not by
some factor which might be causing a
decrease in the number of ducklings per
brood. Further, high quality nesting
areas are still available; there are not
enough black ducks to occupy them.
This conclusion is buttressed by the
results of jerry R. Longcore, a FWS
waterfowl research biologist studying
black ducks in Maine. The preliminary
results of Longcore's work show:

"[T]hat habitat quantity and quality
have improved substantially [in
south-central Maine] but without a
corresponding increase in black
duck numbers." (Longcore, 1981 :7).
The inescapable conclusion is that
black duck production in Maine is down
because there are fewer black ducks
present to produce, not because of a
loss of habitat.
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In Massachusetts, in 1967, 276 black
ducks and 216 mallards were banded by
state employees. In 1981, only 51 black
ducks and 293 mallards were banded using comparable techniques, relatively
constant effort, and in essentially the
same habitat (Hagar, 1982:4; Heusmann
(Mass. State Waterfowl biologist), 1982,
pers. comm.). These data indicate that
habitat is still available, and the relatively small increase in mallards (as compared to the relatively large decrease in
black ducks) cannot be the chief cause
of the black duck decline. The salient
points are that breeding black ducks are
present in far smaller numbers than
previously and that suitable breeding
habitat is apparently still available.
Taken together, these data indicate
the availability of large amounts of
unused or under-utilized breeding habitat
in Canada, New York, Maine, Massachusetts, and probably other areas as well.
While some local decreases in potential
black duck production have undoubtedly
occurred due to habitat degradation and
destruction, essentially all of the actual
decreased production may be attributed
to the insufficient number of breeders to
occupy available habitat.
If environmental contaminants such
as DDT are a serious cause of the black
duck decline, one would expect productivity (in terms of number of young produced per breeding female) to be reduced. This apparently has not been the
case. Howard Spencer, the Migratory
Bird Research Leader in Maine and
Chairman of the Atlantic Flyway Black
Duck Committee, reported the results of
a study of brood size and production
from 1956 to 1981, and concluded that
"none of the data revealed any changing
trends in brood size .... " (Spencer, 1982).
Crissey (1976) and Blandin (1982:121)
likewise reported that the production
rate in individual black ducks is high
(1.49 immatures per adult as estimated
from wing samples; Crissey, 1976:4) when
compared with other species. Also, in the
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l.R.P. analysis the assembled experts
suggested that, while black duck productivity may once have been decreased
by DDT-induced eggshell thinning, this
influence was gone after 1978 (Anon.,
1980:12). This evidence strongly suggests
that black duck productivity is not being
depressed (at least below levels found in
other species) by environmental contaminants.
Finally, it is important to put the
problem of these other potentially limiting factors in perspective. The 19 FWS
professional biologists and experts who
compiled the 1980 l.R.P. analysis concluded that only 15% of the problem of
annual mortality of black ducks wintering on the Atlantic Coast was caused by
the following seven factors taken together: disease, predation, accidents, oil
spills, contaminants, weather and climate, and mallard hybridization and
competition (Anon., 1980:4). Hybridization and competition are discussed in
the following section. Of the remainder,
predation, most accidents, weather and
climate, and most diseases are natural
population forces which cannot be controlled. Oil spills and contaminants may
certainly be important and should be
controlled to the extent possible; however, based on the I RP analysis and logic
they cumulatively represent at most a
small contributing factor in the decline
of the black duck population.
Relationships with Mallards
The FWS in its recent official
publications suggests that another "major factor" in the black duck decline is
"competition with mallards, and hybridization with mallards" (Arnett, 1982:36581).
While some hybridization with mallards
has always occurred on the edges of the
breeding range, there is no reason to
conclude that either hybridization or
competition with the mallard could be
the "major" cause of the continuing decline of the black duck population, for
the reasons which follow.
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Among ducks, competition in the bier
logical sense seldom involves physical
competition. To be sure, two male ducks
of different species (i.e., mallard and
black duck) may fight over a given nest
site or territory. However, this would be
the exception; far more likely, either the
black duck or the mallard finds a particular area already occupied. In such a
case, the bird not occupying the area
would almost certainly be displaced but
no competition, in the physical sense,
would have occurred. In either circumstance (displacement or physical competition), the male and his mate would
simply try to find a suitable alternative
territory and nest site.
Therein lies the essential fallacy in
the view that competition for nesting
sites or territory, as suggested in official
publications of the FWS, is a cause of
black duck decline. Much suitable high
quality breeding habitat is underutilized
throughout the range of the black duck
and has been for many years (see pages
11 to 12). Hence, while competition for
or displacement from a suitable territory
must occasionally occur, there are numerous unoccupied areas available in high
quality habitat. Thus, this type of competition cannot be a cause of the continuing black duck population decline.
The word "competition" can also
be applied to the process of mate selection in ducks. Closely related species
such as the black duck and mallard interbreed occasionally and must, on occasion, compete for mates. This permits
hybridization which has always occurred on the margins of the black duck
breeding range, where mallards and
black ducks intermingle.
Hybridization of black ducks and
mallards, which has now reached 13%
as measured in Atlantic Flyway wing
samples (Anon., 1980:13), has certainly
been exacerbated by the practice of
various State conservation (or fish and
wildlife) agencies, as well as private
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breeding population is insufficient
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caused by a lack of breeders, not by
some factor which might be causing a
decrease in the number of ducklings per
brood. Further, high quality nesting
areas are still available; there are not
enough black ducks to occupy them.
This conclusion is buttressed by the
results of jerry R. Longcore, a FWS
waterfowl research biologist studying
black ducks in Maine. The preliminary
results of Longcore's work show:

"[T]hat habitat quantity and quality
have improved substantially [in
south-central Maine] but without a
corresponding increase in black
duck numbers." (Longcore, 1981 :7).
The inescapable conclusion is that
black duck production in Maine is down
because there are fewer black ducks
present to produce, not because of a
loss of habitat.
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constant effort, and in essentially the
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pers. comm.). These data indicate that
habitat is still available, and the relatively small increase in mallards (as compared to the relatively large decrease in
black ducks) cannot be the chief cause
of the black duck decline. The salient
points are that breeding black ducks are
present in far smaller numbers than
previously and that suitable breeding
habitat is apparently still available.
Taken together, these data indicate
the availability of large amounts of
unused or under-utilized breeding habitat
in Canada, New York, Maine, Massachusetts, and probably other areas as well.
While some local decreases in potential
black duck production have undoubtedly
occurred due to habitat degradation and
destruction, essentially all of the actual
decreased production may be attributed
to the insufficient number of breeders to
occupy available habitat.
If environmental contaminants such
as DDT are a serious cause of the black
duck decline, one would expect productivity (in terms of number of young produced per breeding female) to be reduced. This apparently has not been the
case. Howard Spencer, the Migratory
Bird Research Leader in Maine and
Chairman of the Atlantic Flyway Black
Duck Committee, reported the results of
a study of brood size and production
from 1956 to 1981, and concluded that
"none of the data revealed any changing
trends in brood size .... " (Spencer, 1982).
Crissey (1976) and Blandin (1982:121)
likewise reported that the production
rate in individual black ducks is high
(1.49 immatures per adult as estimated
from wing samples; Crissey, 1976:4) when
compared with other species. Also, in the
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l.R.P. analysis the assembled experts
suggested that, while black duck productivity may once have been decreased
by DDT-induced eggshell thinning, this
influence was gone after 1978 (Anon.,
1980:12). This evidence strongly suggests
that black duck productivity is not being
depressed (at least below levels found in
other species) by environmental contaminants.
Finally, it is important to put the
problem of these other potentially limiting factors in perspective. The 19 FWS
professional biologists and experts who
compiled the 1980 l.R.P. analysis concluded that only 15% of the problem of
annual mortality of black ducks wintering on the Atlantic Coast was caused by
the following seven factors taken together: disease, predation, accidents, oil
spills, contaminants, weather and climate, and mallard hybridization and
competition (Anon., 1980:4). Hybridization and competition are discussed in
the following section. Of the remainder,
predation, most accidents, weather and
climate, and most diseases are natural
population forces which cannot be controlled. Oil spills and contaminants may
certainly be important and should be
controlled to the extent possible; however, based on the I RP analysis and logic
they cumulatively represent at most a
small contributing factor in the decline
of the black duck population.
Relationships with Mallards
The FWS in its recent official
publications suggests that another "major factor" in the black duck decline is
"competition with mallards, and hybridization with mallards" (Arnett, 1982:36581).
While some hybridization with mallards
has always occurred on the edges of the
breeding range, there is no reason to
conclude that either hybridization or
competition with the mallard could be
the "major" cause of the continuing decline of the black duck population, for
the reasons which follow.
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black duck) may fight over a given nest
site or territory. However, this would be
the exception; far more likely, either the
black duck or the mallard finds a particular area already occupied. In such a
case, the bird not occupying the area
would almost certainly be displaced but
no competition, in the physical sense,
would have occurred. In either circumstance (displacement or physical competition), the male and his mate would
simply try to find a suitable alternative
territory and nest site.
Therein lies the essential fallacy in
the view that competition for nesting
sites or territory, as suggested in official
publications of the FWS, is a cause of
black duck decline. Much suitable high
quality breeding habitat is underutilized
throughout the range of the black duck
and has been for many years (see pages
11 to 12). Hence, while competition for
or displacement from a suitable territory
must occasionally occur, there are numerous unoccupied areas available in high
quality habitat. Thus, this type of competition cannot be a cause of the continuing black duck population decline.
The word "competition" can also
be applied to the process of mate selection in ducks. Closely related species
such as the black duck and mallard interbreed occasionally and must, on occasion, compete for mates. This permits
hybridization which has always occurred on the margins of the black duck
breeding range, where mallards and
black ducks intermingle.
Hybridization of black ducks and
mallards, which has now reached 13%
as measured in Atlantic Flyway wing
samples (Anon., 1980:13), has certainly
been exacerbated by the practice of
various State conservation (or fish and
wildlife) agencies, as well as private
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organizations, of releasing tame or
"game farm" mallards. Programs such as
these have been conducted by the Pennsylvania Game Commission, the Maryland Fish and Wildlife Agency, and
groups along the Mississippi Flyway.
Hybridization along the margins of
the black duck range must, however, be
viewed in context. The increasing percentage of hybrids in the population is
caused by the decline of the black duck
population as much as by an absolute increase in hybrids. When the availability
of mates for prospective breeders has
been reduced, black ducks may tend to
breed with the more available and numerous mallard (where the two occur together). Also, the number of hybrids,
when tallied, will be divided by a smaller
black duck population to achieve the
percentage. Under this circumstance the
percentage of hybrids cannot help but
show an increase. When pioneering into
traditional black duck habitat, mallards
are finding much of the suitable habitat
available and unoccupied by black ducks
(see pages 11 to 12). Thus, the mallard
will be recorded as spreading and, in the
terminology of some, the black duck
will have been "displaced." But the
cause of the increase in hybridization
and displacement may not, under these
circumstances, properly be attributed to
the mallard; rather it must be attributed
to the substantial mortality of the black
duck, which has resulted in much underutilized breeding habitat.
This conclusion is not new. Crissey
concluded in his 1976 report that:

"Much has been said lately about
the increase in mallards in the east
and the possibility that mallards are
pushing blacks out of portions of
their breeding range. However, it
seems evident that within the black
duck population as a whole thereproductive rate is very high. This
suggests to me that although mallards are nesting now in portions of
14
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the black duck breeding range where
they were not present before, that
there is no evidence as yet that the
presence of mallards is inhibiting
the ability of blacks to reproduce.
It is a moot question whether mallards would withdraw from areas into which they have extended their
range if black ducks were allowed
to increase to former levels. So, of
course, is the question of whether
the overall black duck breeding
range is as capable of producing
birds as it was before the mallards
moved in. I suggest the only answer
to questions like these is to manage
so as to allow the black duck breeding
population to increase and then see
what happens." (Crissey, 1976:9).
Blandin, in his 1982 doctoral dissertation, came to much the same conclusion:

"Recruitment to the breeding
population probably has been depressed by the removal of too many
young birds. Not only does this ensure a declining population, but in
areas where the black duck must
compete with the mallard, a numerically depressed breeding population is a decided disadvantage."
(Blandin, 1982:122-123).
It is also important to put the current status of this problem into perspective. The FWS, in its official announcements, has described the problem of competition and hybridization
with mallards as "major." However, the
FWS's I.R.P. strategy paper compiled by
19 experts concluded that only 15% of
the current problem could be attributed
to seven factors, only one of which was
hybridization and competition with mallards (Anon., 1980:9). Thus, hybridization
and competition with the mallard must
currently represent a substantially
smaller portion of the problem of declining black ducks than 15%.
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Finally, it is important to note that,
if I and the others are wrong about the
current impact of mallard competition
and hybridization (i.e., they are serious
causes of the decline), the appropriate
management strategy is to eliminate
hunter kill and allow the black duck
breeding population to increase to the
extent possible (presumably to carrying
capacity) (see: Crissey 1976:9; Smith
1983:4). This would dilute the effect of
hybridization and at least give black
ducks the greatest competitive chance.

Hunting: The One Factor Managers
Control
Clearly, the possibility exists that
my analysis and the quoted or cited analyses of others may be in error. After all,
one may never know with absolute certainty which, among many, mortality
factors would have killed the ducks that
otherwise would have nested.
However, it is only reasonable to
assume that hunting is the likely cause
of a population decline (and is preventing population recovery) when, as in the
case of the black duck, hunting is the
known cause of 50 to 60 percent of total
annual mortality (Martinson eta/., 1968;
Geis eta/., 1971; Blandin, 1982, 1982a)
and other mortality causes have been examined and found to be within "reasonable," "normal" I im its.
Moreover, it is nearly axiomatic in
wildlife management that hunting is the
only mortality factor that managers can
control, in a practical sense. For example, Gabrielson (1941) emphasized the
importance of limiting hunter kill as the
primary tool for insuring the preservation of adequate "breeding stock." This
point was again made by Trippensee (1953)
in Volume II of his textbook on wildlife
management. Specifically in reference
to the black duck, the point has been
made, implicitly and explicitly, time and
again that hunting kill is the only mortality factor that can be controlled in
the short run (see particularly Addy,
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1968, 1968a; Anon., 1980:16-17; Heusmann, 1982; Spencer, 1982; Connor (quoting FWS Director Robert A. Jantzen),
1983:2).
And, this guiding principle of wildlife and black duck management is
deeply imbedded in the principles which
presumably guide black duck and all
waterfowl management by the FWS. For
example, then FWS Director Greenwalt
(1976) stated in approving "stabilized
regulations" that they were "designed to
protect the resource base." In the environmental assessment of the stabilized
regulations program for black ducks,
FWS stated that the "[l]ntegrity of the resource base will be maintained." (Anon.,
1976:i). Finally, the FWS, in its "Objectives of the Migratory Bird Hunting
Regulations" published each year (with
the regulations) states as an objective:

"To limit harvest of migratory game
birds to levels compatible with their
ability to maintain their populations." (Arnett, 1982a:16720).
Yet, as Table 1 and the analyses
presented in this paper show, making
adequate and effective reduction in the
kill is the one action which nearly all of
the managers or administrators responsible for the black duck have consistently
failed to take to reverse the population
decline, or even maintain the population.
In 1976, Anderson and Burnham
(1976) showed that, in some mallard
populations which are subject to hunting, the phenomenon of compensatory
mortality occurs, that is: at some level
of resources and population pressure,
and below a certain (threshold) level of
exploitation (kill), as the rate of hunting
mortality increases, the rate of nonhunting mortality decreases, thereby
"compensating." Anderson and Burnham also noted that it may be easy for
kill rates to exceed these threshold
levels, particularly in areas where, or at
times when, ducks are especially vulnerable.
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organizations, of releasing tame or
"game farm" mallards. Programs such as
these have been conducted by the Pennsylvania Game Commission, the Maryland Fish and Wildlife Agency, and
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caused by the decline of the black duck
population as much as by an absolute increase in hybrids. When the availability
of mates for prospective breeders has
been reduced, black ducks may tend to
breed with the more available and numerous mallard (where the two occur together). Also, the number of hybrids,
when tallied, will be divided by a smaller
black duck population to achieve the
percentage. Under this circumstance the
percentage of hybrids cannot help but
show an increase. When pioneering into
traditional black duck habitat, mallards
are finding much of the suitable habitat
available and unoccupied by black ducks
(see pages 11 to 12). Thus, the mallard
will be recorded as spreading and, in the
terminology of some, the black duck
will have been "displaced." But the
cause of the increase in hybridization
and displacement may not, under these
circumstances, properly be attributed to
the mallard; rather it must be attributed
to the substantial mortality of the black
duck, which has resulted in much underutilized breeding habitat.
This conclusion is not new. Crissey
concluded in his 1976 report that:

"Much has been said lately about
the increase in mallards in the east
and the possibility that mallards are
pushing blacks out of portions of
their breeding range. However, it
seems evident that within the black
duck population as a whole thereproductive rate is very high. This
suggests to me that although mallards are nesting now in portions of
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the black duck breeding range where
they were not present before, that
there is no evidence as yet that the
presence of mallards is inhibiting
the ability of blacks to reproduce.
It is a moot question whether mallards would withdraw from areas into which they have extended their
range if black ducks were allowed
to increase to former levels. So, of
course, is the question of whether
the overall black duck breeding
range is as capable of producing
birds as it was before the mallards
moved in. I suggest the only answer
to questions like these is to manage
so as to allow the black duck breeding
population to increase and then see
what happens." (Crissey, 1976:9).
Blandin, in his 1982 doctoral dissertation, came to much the same conclusion:

"Recruitment to the breeding
population probably has been depressed by the removal of too many
young birds. Not only does this ensure a declining population, but in
areas where the black duck must
compete with the mallard, a numerically depressed breeding population is a decided disadvantage."
(Blandin, 1982:122-123).
It is also important to put the current status of this problem into perspective. The FWS, in its official announcements, has described the problem of competition and hybridization
with mallards as "major." However, the
FWS's I.R.P. strategy paper compiled by
19 experts concluded that only 15% of
the current problem could be attributed
to seven factors, only one of which was
hybridization and competition with mallards (Anon., 1980:9). Thus, hybridization
and competition with the mallard must
currently represent a substantially
smaller portion of the problem of declining black ducks than 15%.
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1983:4). This would dilute the effect of
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Control
Clearly, the possibility exists that
my analysis and the quoted or cited analyses of others may be in error. After all,
one may never know with absolute certainty which, among many, mortality
factors would have killed the ducks that
otherwise would have nested.
However, it is only reasonable to
assume that hunting is the likely cause
of a population decline (and is preventing population recovery) when, as in the
case of the black duck, hunting is the
known cause of 50 to 60 percent of total
annual mortality (Martinson eta/., 1968;
Geis eta/., 1971; Blandin, 1982, 1982a)
and other mortality causes have been examined and found to be within "reasonable," "normal" I im its.
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only mortality factor that managers can
control, in a practical sense. For example, Gabrielson (1941) emphasized the
importance of limiting hunter kill as the
primary tool for insuring the preservation of adequate "breeding stock." This
point was again made by Trippensee (1953)
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to the black duck, the point has been
made, implicitly and explicitly, time and
again that hunting kill is the only mortality factor that can be controlled in
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1968, 1968a; Anon., 1980:16-17; Heusmann, 1982; Spencer, 1982; Connor (quoting FWS Director Robert A. Jantzen),
1983:2).
And, this guiding principle of wildlife and black duck management is
deeply imbedded in the principles which
presumably guide black duck and all
waterfowl management by the FWS. For
example, then FWS Director Greenwalt
(1976) stated in approving "stabilized
regulations" that they were "designed to
protect the resource base." In the environmental assessment of the stabilized
regulations program for black ducks,
FWS stated that the "[l]ntegrity of the resource base will be maintained." (Anon.,
1976:i). Finally, the FWS, in its "Objectives of the Migratory Bird Hunting
Regulations" published each year (with
the regulations) states as an objective:

"To limit harvest of migratory game
birds to levels compatible with their
ability to maintain their populations." (Arnett, 1982a:16720).
Yet, as Table 1 and the analyses
presented in this paper show, making
adequate and effective reduction in the
kill is the one action which nearly all of
the managers or administrators responsible for the black duck have consistently
failed to take to reverse the population
decline, or even maintain the population.
In 1976, Anderson and Burnham
(1976) showed that, in some mallard
populations which are subject to hunting, the phenomenon of compensatory
mortality occurs, that is: at some level
of resources and population pressure,
and below a certain (threshold) level of
exploitation (kill), as the rate of hunting
mortality increases, the rate of nonhunting mortality decreases, thereby
"compensating." Anderson and Burnham also noted that it may be easy for
kill rates to exceed these threshold
levels, particularly in areas where, or at
times when, ducks are especially vulnerable.
15

]. W. Grandy- Failure in American Wildlife Management

Interestingly, from 1976 onward,
the FWS used the findings by Anderson
and Burnham (1976) of some compensatory mortality in mallards as a rationale
or partial justification for failing to take
action to restrict or close the season on
black ducks. Paraphrased, the FWS position has been: "that Anderson and Burn-

ham found some compensatory mortality
in mallards, and no one has been able to
prove conclusively that total mortality is
increased in black ducks because of hunting. In short, there is no guarantee that
the population will increase if hunting is
stopped." (see: FWS comments in refusing to close the 1976 black duck season
(Anon., 1976:19)).
Such use of Anderson and Burnham's
work is, in my opinion, a misuse of valid
scientific research. The results of Anderson and Burnham, showing a compensatory relationship between some hunting
and non-hunting mortality in mallards at
certain times and in certain areas does
not absolve wildlife managers, and others responsible for migratory birds, of
using their one major management tool
(limiting or eliminating kill) in an effort
to restore a declining population. After
all, Anderson and Burnham's work could
not in any manner be used as strong support for a hypothesis that the black duck
population decline (averaging about 2%
per year) could not be reversed if the
FWS and CWS were to eliminate the 50
to 60 percent (Blandin, 1982a:2) of total
mortality currently caused by hunting.
And even if someone were to seriously
make such a hypothesis, the only way to
test it with certainty would be to close
the black duck hunting season and monitor the population response.
Moreover, there is substantial reason to conclude that the findings of
Anderson and Burnham regarding the
compensatory nature of hunting and
non-hunting mortality would not be applicable to a seriously declining population I ike the black duck. The phenomenon of compensatory mortality includes
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"concepts of carrying capacity, resource
limitation, and population regulation
through density dependent feedback
processes" (Anderson and Burnham,
1976:7). In short, the phenomenon of
compensation is based on resource limitation (i.e., if an animal dies of something,
more resources will remain for those
left, thereby increasing their chances of
survival). However, in a population, such
as the black duck's, which has declined by
about 60%, and in which there is no
evidence of resource limitation on breeding areas or wintering areas (except temporarily during extremely severe winters),
there is essentially no resource limitation on which the compensation can be
based. Inferential support for this conclusion may be provided by the fact that
Blandin (1982:113), after an exhaustive
analysis of black duck banding data,
could find no evidence of compensatory
mortality in wintering black ducks.

FWS Failure to Act: Chronology
of Events
As noted, the decline of the black
duck is widely recognized among knowledgeable wildlife biologists. During the
years since 1968, the evidence has
changed in character and in response to
changes in methodology; however, the
basic conclusions over the years have remained remarkably consistent. The population is declining and in trouble (Addy,
1968; Addy and Martinson, 1968; Geis et
a/., 1971; Crissey, 1976; Anon., 1976,
1980; Blandin, 1982; Fig. 1). In spite of
this acknowledgment, however, during
the period since even before 1968, there
has been a lack of effective regulatory
restriction to protect black ducks. Officials and managers responsible for
black ducks demonstrated a strong
adherence to the status quo, while the
black duck population continued to
decline (Fig. 1, Table 1).
The magnitude of the failure of the
regulatory system for North American
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TABLE 2 Estimated Retrieved Kill of Black Ducks in Canada and the United
States, 1953-1980. 1

Year

Atlantic
Flyway

Mississippi
Flyway

Total
U.S.'

1953

321,500

188,200

522,700

1954

324,600

197,500

524,000

1955

387,900

230,800

620,200

1956

315,900

185,700

503,700

1957

318,200

202,100

522,000

1958

276,100

168,500

447,600

1959

183,400

123,000

307,500

1960

258,100

135,200

409,200

1961

204,800

62,900

268,700

1962

214,500

47,900

262,900

1963

215,800

70,400

287,300

1964

234,400

96,900

332,200

Total
Canada'

Total
N.A.

1965

217,100

97,600

315,200

1966

281,400

114,600

397,700

1967

265,400

113,100

381,400

1968

301,500

68,300

370,800

274,000

644,800

1969

307,400

88,100

396,900

281,800

678,700

1970

297,400

119,700

417,300

306,200

723,500

1971

293,100

96,000

389,300

310,200

699,600

1972

236,300

117,900

355,600

290,100

645,800

1973

262,700

110,900

374,300

316,700

691,000

1974

294,600

93,300

388,900

308,600

697,500

1975

274,900

81,000

357,100

303,700

660,700

1976

327,400

98,000

426,200

345,400

771,600

1977

195,000

78,900

274,100

359,200

633,300

1978

262,300

74,800

337,100

378,400

714,500

1979

218,700

66,500

285,220

315,400

600,700

19BO

309,000

87,000

396,800

365,200

762,000

'Source: Anon., (1976:28, 1983).
'Includes Central Flyway totals.
'Canadian kill estimates not available prior to 1968

migratory birds may be seen by comparing significant chronicled events with
Table 1 (regulations), Figure 1 (winter inventory record), and Table 2 (kill record).
1955-1967

In 1959, after the high U.S. black
duck kills (averaging 523,375 per year;
Table 2) that were recorded in the four
SUPPLEMENT TO /NT I STUD ANIM PROB 4(4) 1983

years from 1955 through 1958, the FWS
restricted the black duck season from 70
days to 40 days, and kill dropped sharply. In 1960, kill rose again significantly,
and FWS again limited kill. In 1964, the
FWS began liberalizing regulations, and
kill of black ducks increased significantly
(Martinson eta/., 1968:23; Table 1; Table
17
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Interestingly, from 1976 onward,
the FWS used the findings by Anderson
and Burnham (1976) of some compensatory mortality in mallards as a rationale
or partial justification for failing to take
action to restrict or close the season on
black ducks. Paraphrased, the FWS position has been: "that Anderson and Burn-

ham found some compensatory mortality
in mallards, and no one has been able to
prove conclusively that total mortality is
increased in black ducks because of hunting. In short, there is no guarantee that
the population will increase if hunting is
stopped." (see: FWS comments in refusing to close the 1976 black duck season
(Anon., 1976:19)).
Such use of Anderson and Burnham's
work is, in my opinion, a misuse of valid
scientific research. The results of Anderson and Burnham, showing a compensatory relationship between some hunting
and non-hunting mortality in mallards at
certain times and in certain areas does
not absolve wildlife managers, and others responsible for migratory birds, of
using their one major management tool
(limiting or eliminating kill) in an effort
to restore a declining population. After
all, Anderson and Burnham's work could
not in any manner be used as strong support for a hypothesis that the black duck
population decline (averaging about 2%
per year) could not be reversed if the
FWS and CWS were to eliminate the 50
to 60 percent (Blandin, 1982a:2) of total
mortality currently caused by hunting.
And even if someone were to seriously
make such a hypothesis, the only way to
test it with certainty would be to close
the black duck hunting season and monitor the population response.
Moreover, there is substantial reason to conclude that the findings of
Anderson and Burnham regarding the
compensatory nature of hunting and
non-hunting mortality would not be applicable to a seriously declining population I ike the black duck. The phenomenon of compensatory mortality includes
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"concepts of carrying capacity, resource
limitation, and population regulation
through density dependent feedback
processes" (Anderson and Burnham,
1976:7). In short, the phenomenon of
compensation is based on resource limitation (i.e., if an animal dies of something,
more resources will remain for those
left, thereby increasing their chances of
survival). However, in a population, such
as the black duck's, which has declined by
about 60%, and in which there is no
evidence of resource limitation on breeding areas or wintering areas (except temporarily during extremely severe winters),
there is essentially no resource limitation on which the compensation can be
based. Inferential support for this conclusion may be provided by the fact that
Blandin (1982:113), after an exhaustive
analysis of black duck banding data,
could find no evidence of compensatory
mortality in wintering black ducks.

FWS Failure to Act: Chronology
of Events
As noted, the decline of the black
duck is widely recognized among knowledgeable wildlife biologists. During the
years since 1968, the evidence has
changed in character and in response to
changes in methodology; however, the
basic conclusions over the years have remained remarkably consistent. The population is declining and in trouble (Addy,
1968; Addy and Martinson, 1968; Geis et
a/., 1971; Crissey, 1976; Anon., 1976,
1980; Blandin, 1982; Fig. 1). In spite of
this acknowledgment, however, during
the period since even before 1968, there
has been a lack of effective regulatory
restriction to protect black ducks. Officials and managers responsible for
black ducks demonstrated a strong
adherence to the status quo, while the
black duck population continued to
decline (Fig. 1, Table 1).
The magnitude of the failure of the
regulatory system for North American
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TABLE 2 Estimated Retrieved Kill of Black Ducks in Canada and the United
States, 1953-1980. 1

Year

Atlantic
Flyway

Mississippi
Flyway

Total
U.S.'

1953

321,500

188,200

522,700

1954

324,600

197,500

524,000

1955

387,900

230,800

620,200

1956

315,900

185,700

503,700

1957

318,200

202,100

522,000

1958

276,100

168,500

447,600

1959

183,400

123,000

307,500

1960

258,100

135,200

409,200

1961

204,800

62,900

268,700

1962

214,500

47,900

262,900

1963

215,800

70,400

287,300

1964

234,400

96,900

332,200

Total
Canada'

Total
N.A.

1965

217,100

97,600

315,200

1966

281,400

114,600

397,700

1967

265,400

113,100

381,400

1968

301,500

68,300

370,800

274,000

644,800

1969

307,400

88,100

396,900

281,800

678,700

1970

297,400

119,700

417,300

306,200

723,500

1971

293,100

96,000

389,300

310,200

699,600

1972

236,300

117,900

355,600

290,100

645,800

1973

262,700

110,900

374,300

316,700

691,000

1974

294,600

93,300

388,900

308,600

697,500

1975

274,900

81,000

357,100

303,700

660,700

1976

327,400

98,000

426,200

345,400

771,600

1977

195,000

78,900

274,100

359,200

633,300

1978

262,300

74,800

337,100

378,400

714,500

1979

218,700

66,500

285,220

315,400

600,700

19BO

309,000

87,000

396,800

365,200

762,000

'Source: Anon., (1976:28, 1983).
'Includes Central Flyway totals.
'Canadian kill estimates not available prior to 1968

migratory birds may be seen by comparing significant chronicled events with
Table 1 (regulations), Figure 1 (winter inventory record), and Table 2 (kill record).
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In 1959, after the high U.S. black
duck kills (averaging 523,375 per year;
Table 2) that were recorded in the four
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years from 1955 through 1958, the FWS
restricted the black duck season from 70
days to 40 days, and kill dropped sharply. In 1960, kill rose again significantly,
and FWS again limited kill. In 1964, the
FWS began liberalizing regulations, and
kill of black ducks increased significantly
(Martinson eta/., 1968:23; Table 1; Table
17
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2; Fig. 1]3. In 1967, regulations were
restricted slightly (Table 1).
1968
In 1968, the Black Duck Symposium convened most of the then experts and officials knowledgeable and
concerned about black ducks. The officials were deeply troubled, as demonstrated by the following excerpts:

"Recognizing the importance of the
black duck to the Atlantic Flyway
and recognizing that the)species is
not maintaining itself at population
levels compared to those of a few
years past, the Atlantic Waterfowl
Council at its meeting of August 2
and 3, 1967, in Easton, Maryland,
created a Black Duck Committee to
give added emphasis to the needs
of this species. The first action of
the committee was to authorize a
symposium on the black duck for
the purpose of bringing together
most of the known information on
this species and to focus attention
on its future needs." (Anon., 1968:1 ).
"[T]he conclusion I arrive at is that
here we have survey information
for a span of more than ten years
which indicates that the status of
the black duck has deteriorated
significantly. True, we are using the
Winter Survey as a primary indicator .... On the other hand, the long
term trend, as portrayed by the survey, may be reasonably close to being true. In a general way, the trend
in kill and number of hunters tend
'It is important to note here that the regulatory
restrictions begun during the late 1950's and reaching
"most restrictive levels" during the early to mid 1960's
were apparently not aimed primarily at restricting
black duck kill (except slightly during the period
1961-63). Rather, the restrictive regulations were
aimed primarily at limiting overall kill of ducks in
response to low reproduction and populations of
most prairie nesters. This may be seen by comparison
of black duck restrictions (Table 1 ), overall season
lengths in all flyways (Anon., 1975:75), and overall
kill limits (Anon., 1975:94).
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to give credence to the long term
Winter Survey figures." (Addy).
"If we can agree in this meeting that
the black duck population is and
has been at or near its historic low
for the past several years, we
should endeavor to determine why.
In this regard, the evidence indicates that harvest has been excessive in relation to production.
Kill has been the primary factor responsible for holding the population
down to the level that it is." (Addy).
"In the last analysis, however, black
duck production is the end product
resulting from the interaction of all
the positive and negative natural
and man-made forces operating in
the environment and on the population. Whatever the production is,
hunting can take only so much if
the population is to remain stable
or allowed to increase. In other
words, if the productivity of the
black duck is lower than what it used
to be, hunter harvest has to be adjusted accordingly." (Addy (Atlantic Flyway biologist and FWS employee), 1968:3-5).

"[T]he observed Canadian wintering
population of black ducks decreased
by 60 percent from the early 1950's
to the early 1960's. Meanwhile, the
U.S. wintering population decreased
about 25 percent." (Munro).
"Most field workers in Canada
believe that the major cause of this
[black duck's] decline is over-harvest." (Munro).
"Most Canadian biologists are of
the opinion that not all available
habitat is being used because there
are not enough black ducks to occupy it." (Munro (biologist, Canadian Wildlife Service), 1968:6,7,9).

"Habitat outwardly suitable to the
black duck is not always used .... It
SUPPLEMENT TO /NT/ STUD ANIM PROB 4(4) 1983
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is not a new problem but perhaps
occurs more frequently." (Benson
(biologist, N.Y. Department of Conservation), 1968:14).

"At that time [mid 1950's] hunting
regulations were then relaxed and
large kills were made. Despite a
high population, the rate of kill was
sufficient to boost total mortality
higher than productivity and the
black duck population began to dec/ in e. By 1959, the black duck population was obviously at a low level
and hunting regulations were made
very restrictive. The resulting annual kills were small compared to
earlier years but still large enough,
with the much reduced size of the
black duck population, to result in
a kill rate of a magnitude that appears to have prevented an increase
in the population." (Martinson et

a/. (biologists, FWS), 1968:50).
"The thing that really emerges for
me is that I cannot see where there
is any need for more research on
black ducks. It seems to me that
what you have been showing is that
the place where we need the effort
is on the relation between hunting
and the public we are dealing with.
By continuing to press for studies
on production, which seems to me
from the data available to be essentially stable looking at the total picture, we are merely trying to put off
the evil day when we have to make
unpalatable decisions." (Boyd (biologist, Canadian Wildlife Service),
1968:56).

"Although quantitative data is lacking, most biologists in eastern Canada feel that breeding populations
are dec/ ining or are at least at a very
low level (personal communications; Ontario, Blair Dawson; New
Brunswick, Bruce Wright; Nova
Scotia, Anthony Erskine and Fred
SUPPLEMENT TO /NT/ STUD ANIM PROB 4(4] 1983
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Payne; Newfoundland, Doug Gillespie, Dave Pike and jim Inder].
Bartlett (1963) recorded an apparent decrease in breeding population on Prince Edward Island between 1958 and 1961. None of the
biologists mentioned above felt
that the present situation could be
explained by habitat loss, local
pesticide use or other habitat factors. Many felt that available habitat was underpopulated (see also
Bartlett, 1963). Competition with an
expanding population of breeding
mallards (Anas platyrhynchos) has
been .suggested as a cause of dec/ ine in Ontario (Cringan, 1960: see
also ]ohnsgard, 1967). The consensus of opinion is that the size of the
hunting kill is the most likely explanation." (Reed (biologist, Quebec
Wildlife Service), 1968:82).

"Speakers at this symposium
generally shared the opinion that
the black duck population is low
and that wise management dictates
that we do something to increase
the size of the population. Most
speakers also felt that hunting
regulations affect the size and rate
of kill and thus the survival of black
ducks. This paper outlines the regulatory measures needed in order to
bring about an increase in the black
duck popu /ation." (Addy and Martinson, 1968:183).
Addy and Martinson (1968:184-188)
went on to outline and recommend a
detailed 5-year program to restore the
black duck by increasing the population
by 10 percent per year by reducing kill.
In his memorandum to the FWS summarizing the Symposium, Addy (1968a)
stated:

"It was the consensus of the group
that while surveys were unreliable
indicators of population status and
that no surveys gave an accurate
current population figure, the
19
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2; Fig. 1]3. In 1967, regulations were
restricted slightly (Table 1).
1968
In 1968, the Black Duck Symposium convened most of the then experts and officials knowledgeable and
concerned about black ducks. The officials were deeply troubled, as demonstrated by the following excerpts:

"Recognizing the importance of the
black duck to the Atlantic Flyway
and recognizing that the)species is
not maintaining itself at population
levels compared to those of a few
years past, the Atlantic Waterfowl
Council at its meeting of August 2
and 3, 1967, in Easton, Maryland,
created a Black Duck Committee to
give added emphasis to the needs
of this species. The first action of
the committee was to authorize a
symposium on the black duck for
the purpose of bringing together
most of the known information on
this species and to focus attention
on its future needs." (Anon., 1968:1 ).
"[T]he conclusion I arrive at is that
here we have survey information
for a span of more than ten years
which indicates that the status of
the black duck has deteriorated
significantly. True, we are using the
Winter Survey as a primary indicator .... On the other hand, the long
term trend, as portrayed by the survey, may be reasonably close to being true. In a general way, the trend
in kill and number of hunters tend
'It is important to note here that the regulatory
restrictions begun during the late 1950's and reaching
"most restrictive levels" during the early to mid 1960's
were apparently not aimed primarily at restricting
black duck kill (except slightly during the period
1961-63). Rather, the restrictive regulations were
aimed primarily at limiting overall kill of ducks in
response to low reproduction and populations of
most prairie nesters. This may be seen by comparison
of black duck restrictions (Table 1 ), overall season
lengths in all flyways (Anon., 1975:75), and overall
kill limits (Anon., 1975:94).
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to give credence to the long term
Winter Survey figures." (Addy).
"If we can agree in this meeting that
the black duck population is and
has been at or near its historic low
for the past several years, we
should endeavor to determine why.
In this regard, the evidence indicates that harvest has been excessive in relation to production.
Kill has been the primary factor responsible for holding the population
down to the level that it is." (Addy).
"In the last analysis, however, black
duck production is the end product
resulting from the interaction of all
the positive and negative natural
and man-made forces operating in
the environment and on the population. Whatever the production is,
hunting can take only so much if
the population is to remain stable
or allowed to increase. In other
words, if the productivity of the
black duck is lower than what it used
to be, hunter harvest has to be adjusted accordingly." (Addy (Atlantic Flyway biologist and FWS employee), 1968:3-5).

"[T]he observed Canadian wintering
population of black ducks decreased
by 60 percent from the early 1950's
to the early 1960's. Meanwhile, the
U.S. wintering population decreased
about 25 percent." (Munro).
"Most field workers in Canada
believe that the major cause of this
[black duck's] decline is over-harvest." (Munro).
"Most Canadian biologists are of
the opinion that not all available
habitat is being used because there
are not enough black ducks to occupy it." (Munro (biologist, Canadian Wildlife Service), 1968:6,7,9).

"Habitat outwardly suitable to the
black duck is not always used .... It
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is not a new problem but perhaps
occurs more frequently." (Benson
(biologist, N.Y. Department of Conservation), 1968:14).

"At that time [mid 1950's] hunting
regulations were then relaxed and
large kills were made. Despite a
high population, the rate of kill was
sufficient to boost total mortality
higher than productivity and the
black duck population began to dec/ in e. By 1959, the black duck population was obviously at a low level
and hunting regulations were made
very restrictive. The resulting annual kills were small compared to
earlier years but still large enough,
with the much reduced size of the
black duck population, to result in
a kill rate of a magnitude that appears to have prevented an increase
in the population." (Martinson et

a/. (biologists, FWS), 1968:50).
"The thing that really emerges for
me is that I cannot see where there
is any need for more research on
black ducks. It seems to me that
what you have been showing is that
the place where we need the effort
is on the relation between hunting
and the public we are dealing with.
By continuing to press for studies
on production, which seems to me
from the data available to be essentially stable looking at the total picture, we are merely trying to put off
the evil day when we have to make
unpalatable decisions." (Boyd (biologist, Canadian Wildlife Service),
1968:56).

"Although quantitative data is lacking, most biologists in eastern Canada feel that breeding populations
are dec/ ining or are at least at a very
low level (personal communications; Ontario, Blair Dawson; New
Brunswick, Bruce Wright; Nova
Scotia, Anthony Erskine and Fred
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Payne; Newfoundland, Doug Gillespie, Dave Pike and jim Inder].
Bartlett (1963) recorded an apparent decrease in breeding population on Prince Edward Island between 1958 and 1961. None of the
biologists mentioned above felt
that the present situation could be
explained by habitat loss, local
pesticide use or other habitat factors. Many felt that available habitat was underpopulated (see also
Bartlett, 1963). Competition with an
expanding population of breeding
mallards (Anas platyrhynchos) has
been .suggested as a cause of dec/ ine in Ontario (Cringan, 1960: see
also ]ohnsgard, 1967). The consensus of opinion is that the size of the
hunting kill is the most likely explanation." (Reed (biologist, Quebec
Wildlife Service), 1968:82).

"Speakers at this symposium
generally shared the opinion that
the black duck population is low
and that wise management dictates
that we do something to increase
the size of the population. Most
speakers also felt that hunting
regulations affect the size and rate
of kill and thus the survival of black
ducks. This paper outlines the regulatory measures needed in order to
bring about an increase in the black
duck popu /ation." (Addy and Martinson, 1968:183).
Addy and Martinson (1968:184-188)
went on to outline and recommend a
detailed 5-year program to restore the
black duck by increasing the population
by 10 percent per year by reducing kill.
In his memorandum to the FWS summarizing the Symposium, Addy (1968a)
stated:

"It was the consensus of the group
that while surveys were unreliable
indicators of population status and
that no surveys gave an accurate
current population figure, the
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overall Flyway population had been
declining and was probably at its
lowest level of the past 20 years. Papers were presented on the various
factors which tend to reduce the
population or lower its productivity
such as predation, loss of habitat,
pollution, pesticides, and others.
However, with these factors in
operation it was generally agreed
that hunting kill was too great for
the population to maintain itself at
a high level. In fact, it was generally
acknowledged that hunting kill is the
only major mortality factor we can do
anything about at the present time."
In 1968, despite the Symposium, the
recommended kill restrictions, and Addy's
memorandum, FWS took no regulatory
action to restrict kill or to provide additional protection for the black duck
(Table 1).
1969

In 1969, FWS took no regu /a tory action to further restrict kill or to provide
additional protection for the black duck
(Table 1).
1970

In 1970, FWS Iiberal ized black duck
hunting regulations allowing more opportunity for kill by hunters. U.S. kill rose
to 417,400. This was the first time since
1960 that U.S. kill had been over 400,000
(Table 1, Table 2].
1971
In 1971, Geis, Smith, and Rogers (all
FWS biologists) concluded a major study
of black duck population dynamics:

"According to the winter survey,
the continental black duck population declined greatly between 1952
and 1962. It is believed that the
survey data correctly reflect the
population trend during these
years. Although the population was
at a lower level, and the kill much
smaller in 1959-62 than in 1952-54,
band recovery data show that kill
rates were equally high in the two
20
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periods. The population decline
was probably due to a high rate of
kill associated with 70 day seasons
and 4 bird bag limits during 1955-58.
Failure of the black duck population to recover in recent years despite a lower kill is apparently due to
a continued high kill rate". (Geis et
a/.).

"The distribution of mortality
within the year was examined. The
rate at which black ducks died was
4 to 5 times greater during the hunting season than during the remainder of the year. Because there was no
evidence of unusual mortality during the late winter and early spring
it appears that after the close of
the hunting season black ducks survived at a relatively high rate. This
finding reaffirms the importance of
hunting as a mortality factor and
further suggests that late winter and
early spring nonhunting mortality is
not serious when viewed on a continent-wide scale." (Geis eta/., 1971:
63,66).

In 1971, FWS permitted the same
liberalized season restrictions which
were in effect in 1970 (Table 1).
1972
In 1972, the Atlantic Waterfowl
Council's Technical Section Black Duck
sub-committee decided to encourage
more banding "to determine the well being of black duck populations ... " and
greater study of wetland habitat management, including pursuit of the suggestion for a "habitat management symposium." It recommended no hunting
restrictions. (Report of the sub-committee
to the 1972 Atlantic Waterfowl Council
meeting, files, Office of Migratory Bird
Management, Patuxent Wildlife Research
Center).

In 1972, FWS restricted black duck
regulations slightly, but did not make
regulations as restrictive as those that existed in 1968, the year the Black Duck
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Symposium called for major reductions
in hunting mortality (Table 1).
1973

In 1973, again, FWS restricted black
duck regulations slightly, but still did not
even make them as restrictive as those
that existed in 1968 (Table 1).
1974

In 1974, FWS restricted black duck
regulations slightly, but still did not even
make them as restrictive as those that existed in 1968 (Table 1).
In November of 1974, a biologist in
the FWS Migratory Bird and Habitat Research Laboratory wrote to the Director
of that Laboratory after being asked to
evaluate the black duck winter inventories in the Atlantic Flyway in the past
10 years. He announced that he had also
examined relevant kill figures. His
memorandum to FWS concluded:

"In reviewing the material compiled
herein and in rereading the material
in the black duck symposium held
at Chestertown in 1968, I am struck
by what appears to be an inescapable fact- the major amendable problem with the black duck is excessive
harvest." (emphasis in original).
"It seems to me that administrators
are at a point where they can make
one of three decisions: (/) they can
recognize that the resource is in
trouble and that a reduced harvest
is necessary and opt for Martinson's
solution [Addy and Martinson, 1968],
(2) they can decide that realistically
the hunter is too powerful a constituency to buck and continue the
present regulations knowing that
the population will remain permanently depressed, and (3) they can
pass the buck by declaring the need
for more research into all phases of
black duck ecology and put off
hard decisions for several years."
(McGilvery, 1974:1,2).
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1975
In 1975, the winter inventory count
was at the lowest level that had ever
been recorded (Fig. 1 ).
In 1975, I addressed the Atlantic
Waterfowl Council meeting in Atlantic
City, New jersey. I noted that the black
duck population was at a 21-year low
and asked for a moratorium on hunting
to allow the population to rebuild to
former levels. In 1975, Warren Blandin
prepared a paper for the Atlantic Waterfowl Council and his FWS superiors in
which he noted that the increasing
numbers of hunters had nullified much
of the effect of past reductions in season
length and other regulatory restrictions.
Blandin proposed various alternative
types of regulatory restrictions which
would (he hoped) reduce black duck kill
substantially (Blandin, 1975). In 1975,
the Atlantic Waterfowl Council voted to
increase the black duck population, but
failed to recommend to the FWS any
regulatory or other action to accomplish
the objective.

In 1975, the FWS approved a season
with no more restrictions or protection
for the black duck than had been in place
the year before. The season was exactly
the same as 1974 (Table 1).
1976
In March 1976, the Atlantic Waterfowl Council black duck subcommittee
defined the goal: "To produce a rangewide
species management plan [for the black
duck] acceptable to the council." It proposed no restrictions on kill (files, Office
of Migratory Bird Management, Patuxent
Wildlife Research Center).
In June of 1976, the Director of the
Migratory Bird Habitat and Research
Laboratory, FWS, mailed to the "Black
Duck Group" (subcommittee), of the Atlantic Waterfowl Council, a statement
of suggested research topics (Martin,
1976).
In 1976, Crissey (former Director
(for 10 years) of the Migratory Bird
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overall Flyway population had been
declining and was probably at its
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factors which tend to reduce the
population or lower its productivity
such as predation, loss of habitat,
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However, with these factors in
operation it was generally agreed
that hunting kill was too great for
the population to maintain itself at
a high level. In fact, it was generally
acknowledged that hunting kill is the
only major mortality factor we can do
anything about at the present time."
In 1968, despite the Symposium, the
recommended kill restrictions, and Addy's
memorandum, FWS took no regulatory
action to restrict kill or to provide additional protection for the black duck
(Table 1).
1969

In 1969, FWS took no regu /a tory action to further restrict kill or to provide
additional protection for the black duck
(Table 1).
1970

In 1970, FWS Iiberal ized black duck
hunting regulations allowing more opportunity for kill by hunters. U.S. kill rose
to 417,400. This was the first time since
1960 that U.S. kill had been over 400,000
(Table 1, Table 2].
1971
In 1971, Geis, Smith, and Rogers (all
FWS biologists) concluded a major study
of black duck population dynamics:

"According to the winter survey,
the continental black duck population declined greatly between 1952
and 1962. It is believed that the
survey data correctly reflect the
population trend during these
years. Although the population was
at a lower level, and the kill much
smaller in 1959-62 than in 1952-54,
band recovery data show that kill
rates were equally high in the two
20

Monograph

periods. The population decline
was probably due to a high rate of
kill associated with 70 day seasons
and 4 bird bag limits during 1955-58.
Failure of the black duck population to recover in recent years despite a lower kill is apparently due to
a continued high kill rate". (Geis et
a/.).

"The distribution of mortality
within the year was examined. The
rate at which black ducks died was
4 to 5 times greater during the hunting season than during the remainder of the year. Because there was no
evidence of unusual mortality during the late winter and early spring
it appears that after the close of
the hunting season black ducks survived at a relatively high rate. This
finding reaffirms the importance of
hunting as a mortality factor and
further suggests that late winter and
early spring nonhunting mortality is
not serious when viewed on a continent-wide scale." (Geis eta/., 1971:
63,66).

In 1971, FWS permitted the same
liberalized season restrictions which
were in effect in 1970 (Table 1).
1972
In 1972, the Atlantic Waterfowl
Council's Technical Section Black Duck
sub-committee decided to encourage
more banding "to determine the well being of black duck populations ... " and
greater study of wetland habitat management, including pursuit of the suggestion for a "habitat management symposium." It recommended no hunting
restrictions. (Report of the sub-committee
to the 1972 Atlantic Waterfowl Council
meeting, files, Office of Migratory Bird
Management, Patuxent Wildlife Research
Center).

In 1972, FWS restricted black duck
regulations slightly, but did not make
regulations as restrictive as those that existed in 1968, the year the Black Duck
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Symposium called for major reductions
in hunting mortality (Table 1).
1973

In 1973, again, FWS restricted black
duck regulations slightly, but still did not
even make them as restrictive as those
that existed in 1968 (Table 1).
1974

In 1974, FWS restricted black duck
regulations slightly, but still did not even
make them as restrictive as those that existed in 1968 (Table 1).
In November of 1974, a biologist in
the FWS Migratory Bird and Habitat Research Laboratory wrote to the Director
of that Laboratory after being asked to
evaluate the black duck winter inventories in the Atlantic Flyway in the past
10 years. He announced that he had also
examined relevant kill figures. His
memorandum to FWS concluded:

"In reviewing the material compiled
herein and in rereading the material
in the black duck symposium held
at Chestertown in 1968, I am struck
by what appears to be an inescapable fact- the major amendable problem with the black duck is excessive
harvest." (emphasis in original).
"It seems to me that administrators
are at a point where they can make
one of three decisions: (/) they can
recognize that the resource is in
trouble and that a reduced harvest
is necessary and opt for Martinson's
solution [Addy and Martinson, 1968],
(2) they can decide that realistically
the hunter is too powerful a constituency to buck and continue the
present regulations knowing that
the population will remain permanently depressed, and (3) they can
pass the buck by declaring the need
for more research into all phases of
black duck ecology and put off
hard decisions for several years."
(McGilvery, 1974:1,2).
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1975
In 1975, the winter inventory count
was at the lowest level that had ever
been recorded (Fig. 1 ).
In 1975, I addressed the Atlantic
Waterfowl Council meeting in Atlantic
City, New jersey. I noted that the black
duck population was at a 21-year low
and asked for a moratorium on hunting
to allow the population to rebuild to
former levels. In 1975, Warren Blandin
prepared a paper for the Atlantic Waterfowl Council and his FWS superiors in
which he noted that the increasing
numbers of hunters had nullified much
of the effect of past reductions in season
length and other regulatory restrictions.
Blandin proposed various alternative
types of regulatory restrictions which
would (he hoped) reduce black duck kill
substantially (Blandin, 1975). In 1975,
the Atlantic Waterfowl Council voted to
increase the black duck population, but
failed to recommend to the FWS any
regulatory or other action to accomplish
the objective.

In 1975, the FWS approved a season
with no more restrictions or protection
for the black duck than had been in place
the year before. The season was exactly
the same as 1974 (Table 1).
1976
In March 1976, the Atlantic Waterfowl Council black duck subcommittee
defined the goal: "To produce a rangewide
species management plan [for the black
duck] acceptable to the council." It proposed no restrictions on kill (files, Office
of Migratory Bird Management, Patuxent
Wildlife Research Center).
In June of 1976, the Director of the
Migratory Bird Habitat and Research
Laboratory, FWS, mailed to the "Black
Duck Group" (subcommittee), of the Atlantic Waterfowl Council, a statement
of suggested research topics (Martin,
1976).
In 1976, Crissey (former Director
(for 10 years) of the Migratory Bird
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Population Station, FWS, and FWS
Senior Scientist) concluded that the
black duck population was in a serious
decline that was largely caused by hunting mortality:

"[S]ome people would like to
believe that the decrease in black
duck numbers since the 1950's has
been due to environmental factors
other than shooting, and that little
would be accomplished by reducing the harvest. Specifically, a
finger has been pointed at a deterioration of wintering habitat as a
possible cause. I know of nothing
which supports such a contention.
Rather, it seems to me that all of the
available information favors the
hypothesis that over-harvest has
been the most likely cause of the
decline." (Crissey, 1976:6).
Crissey suggested two alternatives:
season closure, or substantial reductions
in season length to severely limit black
duck mortality.
In 1976, the FWS made the following statements of note:

"The upward trend in black duck
harvest since 1961 is statistically
significant at the .05 (95% confidence) level."
"However, the greatly increased
number of active hunters has more
than compensated for the present
reduction in season length and bag
limit." (Anon., 1976:9).
In other words, the minor reduction in
season length by five days (made in
1973, Table 1) and the option for a
"noon Wednesday opening" which was
added in 1974 (neither of which were as
restrictive as the season restrictions in
the late or early 1960's) had been rendered ineffective by increases in the
number of hunters.

In 1976, the Service approved a proposal to "stabilize" hunting regulations
22
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for the next four years, so as to gather
base line data for studying the impact of
hunting on the black duck population
(Anon., 1976:1). This program was designed
to hold the kill constant at the level for
previous years (Anon., 1976:13). Thus, in
1976, the FWS approved the same regulations which had been in effect in 1974
and 1975, which were themselves more
liberal than the regulations in effect
when the 1968 Symposium called formajor reductions in kill (Table 1).
1977
In 1977, FWS employees Martin and
Carney (1977) showed that hunters were
spending more time hunting each year,
thereby showing that even more hunting
pressure was being put on black duck
populations.

In 1977, the FWS approved the same
regulations which had been in effect in
1974, 1975, and 1976 (Table 1).
1978

In 1978, in spite of the four-year
"stabilized regulations" program put into
effect in 1976, the FWS approved regulations which slightly liberalized the restrictions on killing of black ducks (i.e.,
the provision for a noon Wednesday season opening, which was designed to reduce opening day hunting pressure, was
removed; Table 1).
1979
In 1979, a draft of the black duck
"species management plan" was provided
for review to the Atlantic Waterfowl
Council and the FWS. In commenting on
the draft species management plan,
Henry M. Reeves, biologist and Chief,
Branch of Operations, Office of Migratory Bird Management, FWS, concluded:
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decisions are required" (Reeves,
1979).

In 1979, the FWS approved the same
regulations which had been in effect in
1978 (Table 1).
1980
In January 1980, the black duck
winter inventory was at the lowest level
that had ever been recorded (Fig. 1 ).
In June 1980, the FWS published its
official Migratory Bird Program Management Document in which it adopted an
explicit goal:

"21.04 Achieve by 1982, a wintering
black duck population index in the
U.S. of 450,000 based on a 3-year
moving average of winter surveys."
(Anon., 1980a:11).
Unstated was the fact that the goal,
adopted at the Black Duck Symposium
in 1968 (Addy and Martinson, 1968), of
reducing kill by 10 percent per year for
five years to allow restoration of the
species had now been unofficially abandoned. The goal of 450,000 is a winter inventory level last achieved in January,
1969, less than one year after the Black
Duck Symposium recommended, to no
avail, major reductions in kill (Fig. 1).
In September 1980, the FWS published the I.R.P. analysis in which it concluded that most of the mortality causing the black duck population decline
was caused by hunting (Anon., 1980:16).
On September 25, 1980, in response
to another draft of the Atlantic Waterfowl Council's proposed species management plan for the black duck, Henry
M. Reeves wrote:
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the stabilized hunting regulations for
black ducks for another five years
(Anon., 198Gb) and approved the same
regulations which had been in effect in
1978 and 1979 (Table 1).
1981
In January 1981, the winter inventory count rose slightly from its all-time
low.
On July 28-29, 1981, the Atlantic
Waterfowl Council held its summer
meeting. At the meeting, Black Duck
Subcommittee Chairman Spencer (Maine's
then Migratory Bird Research Leader)
discussed the draft black duck management plan and stated:

"The current survival rate information indicates that t!.e young birds
are being harvested at a rate that
doesn't allow the population to
maintain itself." (Minutes of the
Atlantic Waterfowl Council Technical Section, Summer Meeting
1981, files, Patuxent Wildlife Research Center).

In 1981, the FWS adopted the same
regulations on killing of black ducks as
had been used since 1978 (Table 1).
These regulations were less restrictive
than the regulations in effect in 1968,
when the Black Duck Symposium called
for major reductions in hunting kill.

"The bullet-biting time is upon us. I
don't think that we can seriously
consider the possibility that 30
years from now the black ducks
plight will be continuing ever
downward. The public and our "profession" deserves better- even if
some very difficult and unpopular

"It appears that we're trying to
avoid admitting that we have great
concern about the status and trend
of the species, and are reluctant to
consider drastic but needed regulatory measures." (Reeves, 1980).

1982
In January 1982, the winter inventory went down again, this time by 6 percent, to a level of 309,600 (Fig. 1). In the
years since the FWS produced the Migratory Bird Program Management Document, which adopted the objective of
achieving a winter inventory count of
450,000, the FWS had taken not one regulatory action to achieve the objective
(Table 1) and had tabulated winter inventory counts as follows: 1980:281 ,480;
1981:330,461; 1982:309,600. (Fig. 1 ).

In the fall of 1980, the FWS implemented its own proposal to extend

In March 1982, the Service pub I ished
the National Waterfowl Management Plan
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Population Station, FWS, and FWS
Senior Scientist) concluded that the
black duck population was in a serious
decline that was largely caused by hunting mortality:

"[S]ome people would like to
believe that the decrease in black
duck numbers since the 1950's has
been due to environmental factors
other than shooting, and that little
would be accomplished by reducing the harvest. Specifically, a
finger has been pointed at a deterioration of wintering habitat as a
possible cause. I know of nothing
which supports such a contention.
Rather, it seems to me that all of the
available information favors the
hypothesis that over-harvest has
been the most likely cause of the
decline." (Crissey, 1976:6).
Crissey suggested two alternatives:
season closure, or substantial reductions
in season length to severely limit black
duck mortality.
In 1976, the FWS made the following statements of note:

"The upward trend in black duck
harvest since 1961 is statistically
significant at the .05 (95% confidence) level."
"However, the greatly increased
number of active hunters has more
than compensated for the present
reduction in season length and bag
limit." (Anon., 1976:9).
In other words, the minor reduction in
season length by five days (made in
1973, Table 1) and the option for a
"noon Wednesday opening" which was
added in 1974 (neither of which were as
restrictive as the season restrictions in
the late or early 1960's) had been rendered ineffective by increases in the
number of hunters.

In 1976, the Service approved a proposal to "stabilize" hunting regulations
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for the next four years, so as to gather
base line data for studying the impact of
hunting on the black duck population
(Anon., 1976:1). This program was designed
to hold the kill constant at the level for
previous years (Anon., 1976:13). Thus, in
1976, the FWS approved the same regulations which had been in effect in 1974
and 1975, which were themselves more
liberal than the regulations in effect
when the 1968 Symposium called formajor reductions in kill (Table 1).
1977
In 1977, FWS employees Martin and
Carney (1977) showed that hunters were
spending more time hunting each year,
thereby showing that even more hunting
pressure was being put on black duck
populations.

In 1977, the FWS approved the same
regulations which had been in effect in
1974, 1975, and 1976 (Table 1).
1978

In 1978, in spite of the four-year
"stabilized regulations" program put into
effect in 1976, the FWS approved regulations which slightly liberalized the restrictions on killing of black ducks (i.e.,
the provision for a noon Wednesday season opening, which was designed to reduce opening day hunting pressure, was
removed; Table 1).
1979
In 1979, a draft of the black duck
"species management plan" was provided
for review to the Atlantic Waterfowl
Council and the FWS. In commenting on
the draft species management plan,
Henry M. Reeves, biologist and Chief,
Branch of Operations, Office of Migratory Bird Management, FWS, concluded:
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decisions are required" (Reeves,
1979).

In 1979, the FWS approved the same
regulations which had been in effect in
1978 (Table 1).
1980
In January 1980, the black duck
winter inventory was at the lowest level
that had ever been recorded (Fig. 1 ).
In June 1980, the FWS published its
official Migratory Bird Program Management Document in which it adopted an
explicit goal:

"21.04 Achieve by 1982, a wintering
black duck population index in the
U.S. of 450,000 based on a 3-year
moving average of winter surveys."
(Anon., 1980a:11).
Unstated was the fact that the goal,
adopted at the Black Duck Symposium
in 1968 (Addy and Martinson, 1968), of
reducing kill by 10 percent per year for
five years to allow restoration of the
species had now been unofficially abandoned. The goal of 450,000 is a winter inventory level last achieved in January,
1969, less than one year after the Black
Duck Symposium recommended, to no
avail, major reductions in kill (Fig. 1).
In September 1980, the FWS published the I.R.P. analysis in which it concluded that most of the mortality causing the black duck population decline
was caused by hunting (Anon., 1980:16).
On September 25, 1980, in response
to another draft of the Atlantic Waterfowl Council's proposed species management plan for the black duck, Henry
M. Reeves wrote:
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the stabilized hunting regulations for
black ducks for another five years
(Anon., 198Gb) and approved the same
regulations which had been in effect in
1978 and 1979 (Table 1).
1981
In January 1981, the winter inventory count rose slightly from its all-time
low.
On July 28-29, 1981, the Atlantic
Waterfowl Council held its summer
meeting. At the meeting, Black Duck
Subcommittee Chairman Spencer (Maine's
then Migratory Bird Research Leader)
discussed the draft black duck management plan and stated:

"The current survival rate information indicates that t!.e young birds
are being harvested at a rate that
doesn't allow the population to
maintain itself." (Minutes of the
Atlantic Waterfowl Council Technical Section, Summer Meeting
1981, files, Patuxent Wildlife Research Center).

In 1981, the FWS adopted the same
regulations on killing of black ducks as
had been used since 1978 (Table 1).
These regulations were less restrictive
than the regulations in effect in 1968,
when the Black Duck Symposium called
for major reductions in hunting kill.

"The bullet-biting time is upon us. I
don't think that we can seriously
consider the possibility that 30
years from now the black ducks
plight will be continuing ever
downward. The public and our "profession" deserves better- even if
some very difficult and unpopular

"It appears that we're trying to
avoid admitting that we have great
concern about the status and trend
of the species, and are reluctant to
consider drastic but needed regulatory measures." (Reeves, 1980).

1982
In January 1982, the winter inventory went down again, this time by 6 percent, to a level of 309,600 (Fig. 1). In the
years since the FWS produced the Migratory Bird Program Management Document, which adopted the objective of
achieving a winter inventory count of
450,000, the FWS had taken not one regulatory action to achieve the objective
(Table 1) and had tabulated winter inventory counts as follows: 1980:281 ,480;
1981:330,461; 1982:309,600. (Fig. 1 ).

In the fall of 1980, the FWS implemented its own proposal to extend

In March 1982, the Service pub I ished
the National Waterfowl Management Plan
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for the United States, in which it stated a
new goal for the black duck:

"[3) Achieve an upward trend in
black duck populations as measured by the winter survey." (Anon.,
1982:20).
Now gone from FWS planning was
any suggestion that the Service would
impose kill restrictions, such as those
proposed at the Black Duck Symposium,
to restore the black duck population.
Gone even was the goal of raising the
winter inventory to 450,000. In the
March 1982 plan, the FWS was apparently content to "achieve an upward trend
in the black duck population as measured by the winter survey."
On April19, 1982, Howard Spencer,
as Migratory Bird Research Leader of
Maine, published a memorandum entitled "Black Ducks: A Statement of Concern." He noted that kill of black ducks
in Maine had dropped substantially despite the fact that hunting pressure was
essentially constant at about 100,000
hunter days. He also presented data
showing for Maine that: the breeding
black duck population had declined
76%; the wintering population had declined substantially; and fewer than
45% of young black ducks banded in
Maine survive to breed. Spencer recommended that Maine close the black duck
season (Spencer, 1982; Maine, 1982).
In early summer 1982, H. W. Heusmann, the waterfowl biologist for Massachusetts, reported continuing and serious declines of black ducks in Massachusetts (Heusmann, 1982:14-19). These
and other relevant data were summarized
by Joseph A. Hagar, former Massachusetts State Ornithologist and an acknowledged authority on black ducks.
The data show a 45% decline between
1980 and 1981 in kill of black ducks by
hunters, while the number of hunters declined by only 2%. Similarly, the number of black ducks banded in preseason
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in essentially the same areas and with
the same methods in Massachusetts by
state personnel decreased from 276 in
1967 to 51 in 1981. In the same period,
the number of mallards banded increased
from 216 to 293. These figures suggest that
the number of breeding black ducks has
decreased alarmingly in Massachusetts
(Hagar, 1982). Hagar concluded that hunting is a significant contributing cause of
the black duck decline.
In the summer of 1982, Dr. Warren
W. Blandin, Atlantic Flyway biologist,
FWS, completed and made available to
the FWS his doctoral dissertation. Based
on his experience, years of FWS banding
data, and modelling techniques, Dr.
Blandin concluded that hunting throughout the principal breeding range of the
species was causing the population decline (Blandin, 1982:122-123). Blandin
recommended hunting restrictions (Blandin, 1982:160-161 ).
In summer 1982, Howard Spencer,
Chairman of the Black Duck Subcommittee, submitted the Black Duck Management Plan (which had been six years in
preparation) to the Atlantic Waterfowl
Council members for consideration at
their upcoming meeting. In the plan, the
Subcommittee concluded:

Harvest restrictions will be
necessary and should be imposed
for at least a five-year period beginning with the 1982 hunting season."
(emphasis
1982a:15).

in

original). (Spencer,

On July 29, 1982, the Black Duck
Management Plan was presented to the
Atlantic Waterfowl Council for approval. After discussion, the Council voted to
accept the plan, but to put off consideration of any restrictions on kill until next
year.

On September 17, 1982, the FWS announced the same regulations which had
been in effect the previous year[Table 1).
However, in response to the threat of a
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lawsuit from The Humane Society of the
United States, the FWS stated (Potter,
1982:41253-41254) that it would take "necessary and desirable action" in 1983 "to
effectively reduce hunting pressure".
In 1982, biologists and administrators in Maine felt so strongly about the
decline of the black duck that even
though overall U.S. waterfowl management is the responsibility of FWS, they
recommended that Maine close the season unilaterally. Maine officials declined because they felt it would be unfair to Maine hunters unless the FWS
closed the season in the other Atlantic
Flyway States. As a compromise, Maine
took action designed to reduce the kill
in Maine by about 50%. Three other New
England States also felt strongly enough
about the black duck decline to take
minimal restrictive action on their own.
1983

In January of 1983, the winter inventory was at the lowest level ever recorded (Fig. 1 ).
In the spring of 1983, the FWS announced a new objective for black
ducks: to stop the downward population
trend as measured by the winter inventory (Smith, 1983:4). Now gone, and unacknowledged, were the objectives of
(1982) achieving an upward trend, (1980)
achieving a 450,000 winter index level,
and (1968) restoring the population.
In the spring of 1983, the FWS announced plans to reduce kill of black
ducks by 25% in each U.S. State of the
Atlantic Flyway where annual kill currently exceeds 5,000 black ducks. This
would amount to a reduction in kill of
some 12 percent overall since only about
50 percent of total kill occurs in the
United States (Table 2). Moreover, the 25
percent reduction in State kill was adopted
solely for the following reasons:

[1) It is the minimum reduction in
kill which biologists believe they
can make and measure the reducSUPPLEMENT TO /NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 4(4) 1983
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tion [Blandin [Atlantic Flyway
biologist, FWS]; Spencer [Maine
Migratory Bird Research Leader and
Chairman, Black Duck Comm., Atlantic Waterfowl Council]; Comments at the Atlantic Waterfowl
Council meeting, Charleston, S.C.,
july 1982).
[2) It is the maximum reduction
which State Fish and Came Directors in the Atlantic Flyway will accept [Statements made by Atlantic
Flyway State Waterfowl biologists
at the Marc~ 1983 meeting of A tlantic Waterfowl Council, Technical
Section, Torrington, Conn.).
In other words, neither the FWS (Potter,
1983) nor any other Atlantic Flyway
state conservation agency has given any
rationale (or data) suggesting that the
12% reduction in total kill was selected
because it is a number designed to
achieve restoration of the population.
Indeed, the Maine Chapter of the Wildlife Society (a North American organization representing many professional wildlife biologists) in a 1983 statement, noted
that there is no biological reason for believing that such a reduction in total kill
is sufficient to achieve restoration of the
black duck population (Spencer, 1983,
pers. comm.; see also Anon., 1983a). The
Maine Chapter went on to recommend a
three year moratorium on all black duck
hunting in the Atlantic Flyway.
Finally, with the spring 1983 announcement from FWS that black duck
kill will be reduced by 25% in Atlantic
Flyway States (12% overall) comes recognition that the FWS has now essentially reneged on the statement published in
the March 1982 National Waterfowl Management plan:

"Current harvest regulations provide nearly all the regulatory safeguards possible for the species short
of complete closure." (Anon., 1982:
8).
25
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for the United States, in which it stated a
new goal for the black duck:

"[3) Achieve an upward trend in
black duck populations as measured by the winter survey." (Anon.,
1982:20).
Now gone from FWS planning was
any suggestion that the Service would
impose kill restrictions, such as those
proposed at the Black Duck Symposium,
to restore the black duck population.
Gone even was the goal of raising the
winter inventory to 450,000. In the
March 1982 plan, the FWS was apparently content to "achieve an upward trend
in the black duck population as measured by the winter survey."
On April19, 1982, Howard Spencer,
as Migratory Bird Research Leader of
Maine, published a memorandum entitled "Black Ducks: A Statement of Concern." He noted that kill of black ducks
in Maine had dropped substantially despite the fact that hunting pressure was
essentially constant at about 100,000
hunter days. He also presented data
showing for Maine that: the breeding
black duck population had declined
76%; the wintering population had declined substantially; and fewer than
45% of young black ducks banded in
Maine survive to breed. Spencer recommended that Maine close the black duck
season (Spencer, 1982; Maine, 1982).
In early summer 1982, H. W. Heusmann, the waterfowl biologist for Massachusetts, reported continuing and serious declines of black ducks in Massachusetts (Heusmann, 1982:14-19). These
and other relevant data were summarized
by Joseph A. Hagar, former Massachusetts State Ornithologist and an acknowledged authority on black ducks.
The data show a 45% decline between
1980 and 1981 in kill of black ducks by
hunters, while the number of hunters declined by only 2%. Similarly, the number of black ducks banded in preseason
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in essentially the same areas and with
the same methods in Massachusetts by
state personnel decreased from 276 in
1967 to 51 in 1981. In the same period,
the number of mallards banded increased
from 216 to 293. These figures suggest that
the number of breeding black ducks has
decreased alarmingly in Massachusetts
(Hagar, 1982). Hagar concluded that hunting is a significant contributing cause of
the black duck decline.
In the summer of 1982, Dr. Warren
W. Blandin, Atlantic Flyway biologist,
FWS, completed and made available to
the FWS his doctoral dissertation. Based
on his experience, years of FWS banding
data, and modelling techniques, Dr.
Blandin concluded that hunting throughout the principal breeding range of the
species was causing the population decline (Blandin, 1982:122-123). Blandin
recommended hunting restrictions (Blandin, 1982:160-161 ).
In summer 1982, Howard Spencer,
Chairman of the Black Duck Subcommittee, submitted the Black Duck Management Plan (which had been six years in
preparation) to the Atlantic Waterfowl
Council members for consideration at
their upcoming meeting. In the plan, the
Subcommittee concluded:

Harvest restrictions will be
necessary and should be imposed
for at least a five-year period beginning with the 1982 hunting season."
(emphasis
1982a:15).

in

original). (Spencer,

On July 29, 1982, the Black Duck
Management Plan was presented to the
Atlantic Waterfowl Council for approval. After discussion, the Council voted to
accept the plan, but to put off consideration of any restrictions on kill until next
year.

On September 17, 1982, the FWS announced the same regulations which had
been in effect the previous year[Table 1).
However, in response to the threat of a
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lawsuit from The Humane Society of the
United States, the FWS stated (Potter,
1982:41253-41254) that it would take "necessary and desirable action" in 1983 "to
effectively reduce hunting pressure".
In 1982, biologists and administrators in Maine felt so strongly about the
decline of the black duck that even
though overall U.S. waterfowl management is the responsibility of FWS, they
recommended that Maine close the season unilaterally. Maine officials declined because they felt it would be unfair to Maine hunters unless the FWS
closed the season in the other Atlantic
Flyway States. As a compromise, Maine
took action designed to reduce the kill
in Maine by about 50%. Three other New
England States also felt strongly enough
about the black duck decline to take
minimal restrictive action on their own.
1983

In January of 1983, the winter inventory was at the lowest level ever recorded (Fig. 1 ).
In the spring of 1983, the FWS announced a new objective for black
ducks: to stop the downward population
trend as measured by the winter inventory (Smith, 1983:4). Now gone, and unacknowledged, were the objectives of
(1982) achieving an upward trend, (1980)
achieving a 450,000 winter index level,
and (1968) restoring the population.
In the spring of 1983, the FWS announced plans to reduce kill of black
ducks by 25% in each U.S. State of the
Atlantic Flyway where annual kill currently exceeds 5,000 black ducks. This
would amount to a reduction in kill of
some 12 percent overall since only about
50 percent of total kill occurs in the
United States (Table 2). Moreover, the 25
percent reduction in State kill was adopted
solely for the following reasons:

[1) It is the minimum reduction in
kill which biologists believe they
can make and measure the reducSUPPLEMENT TO /NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 4(4) 1983
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tion [Blandin [Atlantic Flyway
biologist, FWS]; Spencer [Maine
Migratory Bird Research Leader and
Chairman, Black Duck Comm., Atlantic Waterfowl Council]; Comments at the Atlantic Waterfowl
Council meeting, Charleston, S.C.,
july 1982).
[2) It is the maximum reduction
which State Fish and Came Directors in the Atlantic Flyway will accept [Statements made by Atlantic
Flyway State Waterfowl biologists
at the Marc~ 1983 meeting of A tlantic Waterfowl Council, Technical
Section, Torrington, Conn.).
In other words, neither the FWS (Potter,
1983) nor any other Atlantic Flyway
state conservation agency has given any
rationale (or data) suggesting that the
12% reduction in total kill was selected
because it is a number designed to
achieve restoration of the population.
Indeed, the Maine Chapter of the Wildlife Society (a North American organization representing many professional wildlife biologists) in a 1983 statement, noted
that there is no biological reason for believing that such a reduction in total kill
is sufficient to achieve restoration of the
black duck population (Spencer, 1983,
pers. comm.; see also Anon., 1983a). The
Maine Chapter went on to recommend a
three year moratorium on all black duck
hunting in the Atlantic Flyway.
Finally, with the spring 1983 announcement from FWS that black duck
kill will be reduced by 25% in Atlantic
Flyway States (12% overall) comes recognition that the FWS has now essentially reneged on the statement published in
the March 1982 National Waterfowl Management plan:

"Current harvest regulations provide nearly all the regulatory safeguards possible for the species short
of complete closure." (Anon., 1982:
8).
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Thus throughout the period of the
60% black duck decline, the FWS consistently: (1) ignored its own self-expressed duty (see p. 15) and black duck
population goals, (2) failed to follow the
advice of its own officials and experts,
and (3) failed to take sufficient protective
action to reverse the population decline
and restore the species.
Reasons for FWS Failure to
Take Action
The question remains, WHY? Why
has the FWS allowed this situation to
develop without taking corrective action? Why has FWS ignored the guiding
tenet of wildlife management that the
first duty is to preserve and protect the
population base? Why has FWS consistently ignored the principle that mortality due to sport hunting is the one form
of mortality that wildlife managers can
control? Why has FWS consistently ignored the best recommendations and
suggestions of its own experts that hunting be severely limited to allow the
population to rebuild to the extent
possible? After all, the annual kill of
black ducks is about 700,000; hunting
causes between 50 and 60 percent of the
total annual mortality; and the population has continued its gradual decline
and will undoubtedly never be able to
recover its population (even if hunting
mortality ends immediately) in some
portions of its former range from which
it has been eliminated. With all this
evidence, the question remains: why has
this been allowed to happen? 4 And the
answer, while it is perhaps best exemplified by the case of the black duck, is
also important for many other species of
American wildlife, because this case is
not an anomaly.
And, even if the FWS and other officials reconsider in 1983, and close the
black duck season, the record of inaction will still have been a classic as a
failure of modern day wildlife manage26
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ment-a failure which should never be
repeated.
Reasons for the failure of the FWS
and officials responsible for the black
duck to "bite the bullet" and provide
necessary protection for the black duck
can only be inferred from the official
literature of those involved. Obviously,
no employees, even mavericks, inside a
governmental agency can spend much
time criticizing the official position of
their employer and still be employed.
And, most potential employers in the
wildlife management field are linked directly or indirectly through contributions of funds, cooperative working relationships, professional societies, and
other similar "ties that bind." While
these ties are essential for the timely
transfer of information among professionals and interest groups, they also
tend, in my experience, to inhibit critical
analyses of the management actions of
one's associates. Yet, some candid and
revealing remarks bear repeating for
their illustrative value.

"The thing that really emerges for
me is that I cannot see where there
is any need for more research on
black ducks. It seems to me that
what you have been showing is that
the place where we need the effort
is on the relation between hunting
and the public we are dealing with.
By continuing to press for studies
on production, which seems to me
from the data available to be essentially stable looking at the total pic'The question, it should be noted, is not whether
the information available in any year noted in the
chronology was later proven to be accurate in
every respect or was the best that could ever have
been obtained. The fact is that at essentially each
year, the best information available at the time and
the expert opinion of FWS personnel and others indicated that the black duck population was declining and in trouble; yet the FWS and other officials
failed and often refused to take effective regulatory action to protect the black duck. The question
is: why did the failure occur?
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ture, we are merely trying to put off
the evil day when we have to make
unpalatable decisions." (Boyd (biologist, Canadian Wildlife Service),
1968:56).

"It seems to me that administrators
are at a point where they can make
one of three decisions: (1) they can
recognize that the resource is in
trouble and that a reduced harvest
is necessary and opt for Martinson's
[Addy and Martinson, 1968] solution, (2) they can decide that realistically the hunter is too powerful a
constituency to buck and continue
the present regulations knowing
that the population will remain permanently depressed, and (3) they
can pass the buck by declaring the
need for more research into all
phases of black duck ecology and
put off hard decisions for several
years." (McGilvery (biologist, FWS),
1974).

"The bullet-biting time is upon us. I
don't think that we can seriously
consider the possibility that 30
years from now the black ducks
plight will be continuing ever
downward. The public and our 'profess ion' deserves better- even if
some very difficult and unpopular
decisions are required." (Reeves
(biologist, FWS), 1979).

"We should consider the hunter
and the species collectively. We
say we want to improve the status
of the black duck and if we do, we
are not going to do it by defending
the current status to keep the sportsman happy because we are progressively taking it away from them by
doing so." (Blandin (Atlantic Flyway Biologist), comments in the
Minutes of the Atlantic Waterfowl
Council Technical Session Summer
Meeting (1981 ), files, Office of MiSUPPLEMENT TO /NT j STUD ANIM PROB 4(4) 1983
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gratory Bird Management, Patuxent Wildlife Research Center).
The above quotes from experienced
FWS biologists indicate that one reason
for the failure of the management community to take effective protective action for the black duck is the necessity
for making "hard" or "unpalatable" or
"difficult" decisions. This reference is
primarily to the fact that the black duck
is a species highly desired by hunters.
Decisions described as "hard" or "unpalatable" mean decisions which hunters would find hard to accept or unpalatable. Hunters, being the primary influential constituency of State fish and
wildlife agencies and the FWS, have an
inordinate influence over decisions, and
if administrators believe that many hunters will find a prospective decision unpalatable, there will be- as there has
been in the case of the black duck- an
aversion to making the decision.
In the case of the black duck, this
unpalatability would be heightened by
the fact that even though the black duck
population has declined markedly, it is
still very important in the average "hunter's
bag" (and is one of a relatively small
number of ducks to shoot) throughout
the New England states. In other words,
even though the black duck population
has declined by about 60%, hunters in
New England and as far south as New
jersey still "see a lot". Hunters would, it
has been widely perceived, be "upset" if
they "see a lot" of black ducks and cannot shoot them. Thus as the Blandin
quote makes clear, one reason for failing to take action, and defending the
status quo, has been the desire to "keep
the sportsman happy".

"Sixth, there is a question about
how a reduction in harvest should
be accomplished- and at this point
politics rears its ugly head." (Crissey (former FWS Chief of Migratory Bird Management), 1976:8).
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primarily to the fact that the black duck
is a species highly desired by hunters.
Decisions described as "hard" or "unpalatable" mean decisions which hunters would find hard to accept or unpalatable. Hunters, being the primary influential constituency of State fish and
wildlife agencies and the FWS, have an
inordinate influence over decisions, and
if administrators believe that many hunters will find a prospective decision unpalatable, there will be- as there has
been in the case of the black duck- an
aversion to making the decision.
In the case of the black duck, this
unpalatability would be heightened by
the fact that even though the black duck
population has declined markedly, it is
still very important in the average "hunter's
bag" (and is one of a relatively small
number of ducks to shoot) throughout
the New England states. In other words,
even though the black duck population
has declined by about 60%, hunters in
New England and as far south as New
jersey still "see a lot". Hunters would, it
has been widely perceived, be "upset" if
they "see a lot" of black ducks and cannot shoot them. Thus as the Blandin
quote makes clear, one reason for failing to take action, and defending the
status quo, has been the desire to "keep
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"Sixth, there is a question about
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be accomplished- and at this point
politics rears its ugly head." (Crissey (former FWS Chief of Migratory Bird Management), 1976:8).
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Crissey's quote brings up another
reason for failing to act: politics. In the
case of setting regulations, political influence can take a wide variety of forms.
The most basic one is the one to which
Crissey alludes: perceived political equity. Each state and indeed each country
in the Atlantic Flyway wants to be treated
equally, politically. One state does not
want to take action that will make its
hunters unhappy and will benefit the
other states, unless the other states take
a similar action. The same analogy applies somewhat less rigidly to actions of
the U.S. and Canada.
This reaction, which is fully understandable as a matter perceived political equity, is a major deterrent to having
the individual states in the Atlantic
Flyway agree on a common plan of action. The problem is that political equity
or equality often does not comport with
biological necessity or management
needs.
As an hypothetical example, some
states may not wish to reduce kill of
black ducks, because (inter alia) they do
not have many black ducks and their
hunters cannot distinguish them from
other ducks, or because they have "plenty" and want their hunters to shoot them
regardless of the overall status of the
population. In such circumstances, the
easiest and most common reaction is for
the states to maintain the status quo or
adopt a solution which represents the
"lowest common denominator". And
the detrimental impact of this phenomenon is compounded since, for whatever reasons, the FWS consistently fails
to exert "leadership" on any group of
state fish and wildlife agencies unless it
obtains unanimous or nearly unanimous
agreement beforehand.
I

For example, consider what occurred in setting the 1982-83 black duck
season in the Atlantic flyway. Maine
biologists believed that the black duck
season should be closed throughout the
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Flyway and in Maine, and so recommended (Spencer, 1982; Maine, 1982;
Discussions at Atlantic Waterfowl Council meeting, S\Jmmer, 1982). Atlantic
Flyway waterfowl biologists could all
agree that at least some restrictions on
kill were necessary beginning in 1982
and so recommended (Spencer, 1982a:15).
However, at the Atlantic Waterfowl
Council summer meeting (where all
states in the Atlantic Flyway met to
"agree" on seasons to be recommended
to FWS), some states (most notably New
jersey) objected to any restrictions in
1982. The FWS did not want to force
restrictions without agreement from the
states and some protective action from
Canada. The result was that the Atlantic
Waterfowl Council voted (the lowest
common denominator) to put off any
restrictions until at least 1983.
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numbers may not be a reality (i.e.,
comments on quality of winter survey on p. 8-9) and that hunting may
not be preventing population increase (p. 18). Those two points will
be our main defense against external pressures for closure and other
attacks which could prevent us
from implementing the plan."
(Reed (biologist, Canadian Wildlife
Service), 1980: comments in a letter to Spencer concerning a draft
of the black duck management plan).

"I am pleased with the way you
show that the apparent decline in

This quote elucidates another
reason for failing to protect the black
duck which is particularly ironic. My
analysis of the quote, based on my experience, is that the author is thanking
Spencer (as Black Duck Committee Chairman of the Atlantic Waterfowl Council)
for not emphasizing the decline portrayed by the winter inventory and not
emphasizing the negative impact which
hunting kill (50 to 60 percent of total
mortality) was almost certainly having
on the population. The author notes that
these two points will be the main defense against efforts to close the black
duck hunting season (so that Canada can
implement "the plan", which called for
relatively modest reductions in black
duck kill (Spencer, 1982a)).
In my view, the reason for the author's concern is an increasingly apparent fear in much of the wildlife management community of closing hunting seasons. In the black duck situation, the
fear of many officials of closing the season is that the season may never be reopened, the "anti-hunting element" may
be credited with a victory, and/or the
agencies affected will lose support and/
or revenues (since hunter constituencies
and/or I icense fees are very important to
FWS, CWS, and State and Provincial agencies).
The point is, however, that, all
arguments about hunting and anti-hunting aside, wildlife biologists have always
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Subsequently, Maine refused to
close the season in 1982 because political officials in Maine believed it would
be "unfair" to Maine's hunters unless
the other Atlantic flyway states also
closed the season (see: newspaper article quoting Maine Fish and Wildlife
Commissioner Manuel by Brian Thayer,
Maine Sunday Telegram, August 15, 1982,
page 7B, (files, Office of Migratory Bird
Management, FWS, Washington D.C.)).
Maine's "compromise" was to adopt
regulations designed to reduce the kill
by about 50%. The regulations they
adopted were designed to avoid, as
much as possible, shooting black ducks
that bred or were hatched in Maine,
while allowing hunters to kill migrants
from Canada. Such a decision made perfect political sense for Maine, but largely ignored the needs of the black duck.
Indeed, throughout the process, the
needs of the black duck had been consistently relegated to a lower status than
preserving the status quo and attaining
the lowest common denominator.
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maintained that their first duty was to
protect and preserve viable wildlife
populations, presumably throughout their
ranges. Yet, the resistance to making
necessary restrictions engendered by
this fear is tantamount to putting the
welfare of hunters and hunting above
the welfare of the black duck populations in question. For example, this fear
is, in my opinion, a major reason why the
FWS in 1983 is suggesting an admittedly
minimum reduction (12%) in total kill
(see page 25) in spite of the March 1982 National Waterfowl Management Plan statement that :

"Current harvest regulations provide nearly all the regulatory safeguards possible for the species short
of complete closure." (Anon., 1982:8).
Ironically, in a case like the black duck
where the population has declined markedly, such fear-engendered-action (or inaction) only gives anti-hunters and nonhunters more reasons to be against hunting.
There is, in my view, another reason
for the FWS failure to act which is apparent from the information at hand.
The black duck decline occurred slowly,
except in the late 1950's (Fig. 1). FWS
personnel and others, as scientists, did
not want to "overreact", particularly in
light of political pressures and group
pressure to maintain the status quo or
adopt the "lowest common denominator" (see page 28). For that reason, beginning with the serious advocacy of major
restrictions on black duck hunting (as
represented by the 1968 Black Duck
Symposium), cautious and politically
aware officials resisted making the recommended restrictions, and they were
not made. Officials began to rationalize,
in spite of the continuing population decline, and to develop "reasons" for not
taking regulatory action to protect black
ducks and stop the population decline
(see: for example, Anon., 1975; 1976; Potter, 1982, 1983; Arnett, 1982).
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Eventually, having these rationalizations continue to be accepted and believed became, in my view, a matter on
which those involved felt that their professional integrity or credibility depended.
For example, to finally admit that the
population was declining or in trouble
would have been to "lose face" or lose
professional credibility. At that point,
the arguments became nearly self-generating. Each rationalization for not taking action begat another rationalization
for not taking regulatory action.
These rationalizations have now reversed the wildlife manager's duty, as
expressed by Gabrielson (1941) and numerous others, to take action to I im it ki II
as the major technique to preserve populations. And, the concepts of Gabrielson and the others are fully imbedded in
the FWS principles guiding migratory
bird management:

"To limit harvest of migratory game
birds to levels compatible with their
ability to maintain their populations." (Arnett, 1982a:16720).
Yet, the FWS now supports its decision
not to close the 1983 black duck season
by stating:

"There is no demonstrable cause
and effect relationship between
harvest /eve/ and the size of the
continental black duck population."
(Potter, 1983:27802).
An analysis of the final, and overriding, reason for the failure of the FWS
regulatory system with respect to the
black duck was conducted in 1976 by
Ted Williams (former editor of the Massachusetts Fish and Wildlife Agency
magazine, Massachusetts Wildlife) in the
prestigious hunting journal Gray's Sporting journal. Williams concluded:

"And indeed, it appears that the
management complex has permitted
the black to be sorely overshot. Since
the peak in the mid-fifties, hunters
30
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have annually accounted for between 15 and 25 percent of the population, certainly a significant
chunk when you consider the other
pressures on the species. Furthermore, in the current black duck
population there is an abnormally
high percentage of juveniles- a
solid indication in any species of
heavy mortality among adults. Although the daily bag limit was cut
from four to two quite a while after
it became evident that the black
duck was in serious trouble, the
number of black duck hunters has
since doubled. Thus despite the attempted cutback, the rate of harvest has essentially remained constant. As one courageous federal
waterfowl biologist publicly declared .... lncreased hunting pressure
has nullified much of the management effort. Administrators must
decide on a population objective
for the black duck. If they sanction
a program of population increase,
they must recognize that the measures necessary to achieve that objective will hurt!
"Sadly, however, the management
bosses who dictate fish and wildlife
policy lack self- discipline. The problem is that they are funded almost
entirely by sportsmen- the very
party they are obligated to regulate
and educate. Imagine the curriculum at a school where the children
signed the teachers' paychecks. The
current set-up is as unfair to sportsmen- whose long-term best interests are not being served- as it is to
non-sporting conservationists who
are denied representation in conservation decision making.
"Managers have traditionally
employed winter counts as a tool
for setting waterfowl seasons. Yet,
last year when a group of conservation organizations, calling themSUPPLEMENT TO /NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 4{4) 1983
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selves The Friends of the Black
Duck, argued for a brief moratorium on black duck hunting, citing
21 years of dwindling winter counts
as evidence of the need, they were
informed by the management complex that the counts were unreli- ·
able. Managers can't have it both
ways. Winter counts can't be effective tools for modern game management when they want to sell licenses, and worthless guesstimates
when someone wants to limit immediate hunting opportunity.
"When the conservation group
communicated their concern over
the black duck's plight to some of
the fish and game departments in
the Atlantic Flyway they received
the most curious responses- to the
effect that the black was such a
popular game species that hunters
couldn't be asked to refrain from
shooting out the resource. Typical
of this doublethink was the astonishing declaration of the Migratory
Bird Research Leader of Maine. 'I'm
sure you're aware,' said he, 'that the
black duck is the only significant
puddle duck in most of the Northeast and to deprive Maine hunters of
any chance to harvest some would
create very serious sociological
problems.' (Emphasis added.)
"The trouble with fish and game
departments these days is that they
don't manage fish and game, they
manage sportsmen; and they aren't
staffed by biologists, they're staffed
by sociologists. The concern is not
for the problems of the black duck
hunter of 1980. It is for the appetites
of the vociferous, a typical black
duck hunter of the moment- the one
breathing down the manager's
neck. Such is the effect of specialinterest funding on professional
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principles." (Williams, 1976:34- 35).
Although Williams utilizes rhetoric
and broad generalizations which rely, in
this quotation, on some points which are
technically inaccurate, his broad conclusions are, in my view, compelling and
essentially accurate. Unfortunately, Williams omits, probably because of his
familiarity with the regulatory process,
substantial and critical portions of the
analysis. First, the black duck is valuable: even in reduced numbers, it is
still the prize duck for hunters in New
England states. Put another way, many
hunters prize the black duck above all
other species (Hagar, 1982), because it is
wary and reputedly difficult to kill. Furthermore, many hunters view success in
killing a black duck as an indication of
their skill as hunters. Thus, the black
duck is valuable, beyond any monetary
value; to the individual hunter who esteems the black duck as a trophy, prize,
or symbol of excellence. For avid hunters who do not know or do not care
about the decline of the black duck,
there is a powerful lobby for continued
or increased hunting of black ducks;
even hunters who do know and do care
will be intimidated from taking on their
fellow hunters and changing the status
quo.
Furthermore, the black duck is of
critical value- or is thought to be of
critical value- to the State fish and
wildlife (or conservation) agencies of the
individual states in New England. License fees largely support the operations of these agencies. It is widely believed in much of New England that if
hunters could not hunt black ducks,
many would not hunt, thus substantially
reducing the revenues that pay for salaries and programs of the agencies. And
inevitably in the Atlantic Waterfowl Council, there is the feeling that "I'll help you
with your seasons (and license fees), if
you help me with mine."
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Eventually, having these rationalizations continue to be accepted and believed became, in my view, a matter on
which those involved felt that their professional integrity or credibility depended.
For example, to finally admit that the
population was declining or in trouble
would have been to "lose face" or lose
professional credibility. At that point,
the arguments became nearly self-generating. Each rationalization for not taking action begat another rationalization
for not taking regulatory action.
These rationalizations have now reversed the wildlife manager's duty, as
expressed by Gabrielson (1941) and numerous others, to take action to I im it ki II
as the major technique to preserve populations. And, the concepts of Gabrielson and the others are fully imbedded in
the FWS principles guiding migratory
bird management:

"To limit harvest of migratory game
birds to levels compatible with their
ability to maintain their populations." (Arnett, 1982a:16720).
Yet, the FWS now supports its decision
not to close the 1983 black duck season
by stating:

"There is no demonstrable cause
and effect relationship between
harvest /eve/ and the size of the
continental black duck population."
(Potter, 1983:27802).
An analysis of the final, and overriding, reason for the failure of the FWS
regulatory system with respect to the
black duck was conducted in 1976 by
Ted Williams (former editor of the Massachusetts Fish and Wildlife Agency
magazine, Massachusetts Wildlife) in the
prestigious hunting journal Gray's Sporting journal. Williams concluded:

"And indeed, it appears that the
management complex has permitted
the black to be sorely overshot. Since
the peak in the mid-fifties, hunters
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have annually accounted for between 15 and 25 percent of the population, certainly a significant
chunk when you consider the other
pressures on the species. Furthermore, in the current black duck
population there is an abnormally
high percentage of juveniles- a
solid indication in any species of
heavy mortality among adults. Although the daily bag limit was cut
from four to two quite a while after
it became evident that the black
duck was in serious trouble, the
number of black duck hunters has
since doubled. Thus despite the attempted cutback, the rate of harvest has essentially remained constant. As one courageous federal
waterfowl biologist publicly declared .... lncreased hunting pressure
has nullified much of the management effort. Administrators must
decide on a population objective
for the black duck. If they sanction
a program of population increase,
they must recognize that the measures necessary to achieve that objective will hurt!
"Sadly, however, the management
bosses who dictate fish and wildlife
policy lack self- discipline. The problem is that they are funded almost
entirely by sportsmen- the very
party they are obligated to regulate
and educate. Imagine the curriculum at a school where the children
signed the teachers' paychecks. The
current set-up is as unfair to sportsmen- whose long-term best interests are not being served- as it is to
non-sporting conservationists who
are denied representation in conservation decision making.
"Managers have traditionally
employed winter counts as a tool
for setting waterfowl seasons. Yet,
last year when a group of conservation organizations, calling themSUPPLEMENT TO /NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 4{4) 1983
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selves The Friends of the Black
Duck, argued for a brief moratorium on black duck hunting, citing
21 years of dwindling winter counts
as evidence of the need, they were
informed by the management complex that the counts were unreli- ·
able. Managers can't have it both
ways. Winter counts can't be effective tools for modern game management when they want to sell licenses, and worthless guesstimates
when someone wants to limit immediate hunting opportunity.
"When the conservation group
communicated their concern over
the black duck's plight to some of
the fish and game departments in
the Atlantic Flyway they received
the most curious responses- to the
effect that the black was such a
popular game species that hunters
couldn't be asked to refrain from
shooting out the resource. Typical
of this doublethink was the astonishing declaration of the Migratory
Bird Research Leader of Maine. 'I'm
sure you're aware,' said he, 'that the
black duck is the only significant
puddle duck in most of the Northeast and to deprive Maine hunters of
any chance to harvest some would
create very serious sociological
problems.' (Emphasis added.)
"The trouble with fish and game
departments these days is that they
don't manage fish and game, they
manage sportsmen; and they aren't
staffed by biologists, they're staffed
by sociologists. The concern is not
for the problems of the black duck
hunter of 1980. It is for the appetites
of the vociferous, a typical black
duck hunter of the moment- the one
breathing down the manager's
neck. Such is the effect of specialinterest funding on professional

SUPPLEMENT TO /NT 1 STUD ANIM PROB 4{4) 1983

Monograph

principles." (Williams, 1976:34- 35).
Although Williams utilizes rhetoric
and broad generalizations which rely, in
this quotation, on some points which are
technically inaccurate, his broad conclusions are, in my view, compelling and
essentially accurate. Unfortunately, Williams omits, probably because of his
familiarity with the regulatory process,
substantial and critical portions of the
analysis. First, the black duck is valuable: even in reduced numbers, it is
still the prize duck for hunters in New
England states. Put another way, many
hunters prize the black duck above all
other species (Hagar, 1982), because it is
wary and reputedly difficult to kill. Furthermore, many hunters view success in
killing a black duck as an indication of
their skill as hunters. Thus, the black
duck is valuable, beyond any monetary
value; to the individual hunter who esteems the black duck as a trophy, prize,
or symbol of excellence. For avid hunters who do not know or do not care
about the decline of the black duck,
there is a powerful lobby for continued
or increased hunting of black ducks;
even hunters who do know and do care
will be intimidated from taking on their
fellow hunters and changing the status
quo.
Furthermore, the black duck is of
critical value- or is thought to be of
critical value- to the State fish and
wildlife (or conservation) agencies of the
individual states in New England. License fees largely support the operations of these agencies. It is widely believed in much of New England that if
hunters could not hunt black ducks,
many would not hunt, thus substantially
reducing the revenues that pay for salaries and programs of the agencies. And
inevitably in the Atlantic Waterfowl Council, there is the feeling that "I'll help you
with your seasons (and license fees), if
you help me with mine."
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The key to the failure of the
regulatory system is, in my view, the real
or perceived value of black ducks to the
hunter or to the bureaucracy which is
dependent upon hunting license fees and/
or a hunter constituency. Without the
value of license fees there would be little concern over closing a season. Without the value, there would not be an influential constituency composed almost
solely of hunters. Without the value, the
political pressure would not be for equity in opportunities to kill, but rather for
preserving the species. Without the value, politicians and others would not feel
the same political pressures for preserving the status quo and building rationalizations.
In case after case, to varying degrees, this pattern of yielding to vocal
consumptive interests (or just failing to
take action) to the detriment of wildlife
has become apparent wherever the wildlife species at issue is perceived as valuable for recreational, trophy or commercial purposes, or is perceived as having great significance for generating
hunter interest and license fees; and
wherever active demand exceeds the
capacity of the species for regeneration.
This pattern has been apparent most recently with respect to bobcats (Lynx rufus) and east coast striped bass (Roccus
saxatilis), and is becoming increasingly
apparent with respect to regulations
concerning highly sought-after species
of waterfowl such as mallards, canvasbacks (Aythya valisineria), and pintails
(Anas acuta acuta), all of which are currently at or near historic low population
levels, and all of which have been subject to essentially the same regulations
for many years.
Unless corrective action is taken,
black duck-like regulatory failures will increase if waterfowl and other wildlife populations decline, while hunter pressure
on and demand for the species remain
high.
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